The Public Law of a County Court; Judicial Government in Eighteenth Century Massachusetts by Hartog, Hendrik
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
1976
The Public Law of a County Court; Judicial
Government in Eighteenth Century Massachusetts
Hendrik Hartog
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Legal History Commons, and the United States History Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hartog, Hendrik, "The Public Law of a County Court; Judicial Government in Eighteenth Century Massachusetts" (1976). Articles by
Maurer Faculty. Paper 1920.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/1920
The Public Law of a County Court;
Judicial Government in Eighteenth
Century Massachusetts.
by HENDRIK HARTOG*
INTRODUCTION
Throughout eighteenth century America counties were gov-
erned by courts held collectively by local justices of the peace. For-
mally described as courts of general (or quarter) sessions of the
peace and popularly known as sessions courts, these courts were
empowered "to hear and determine all matters relating to the con-
servation of the peace and punishment of offenders and whatsoever
is cognizable by them by law."1 To modern eyes their authority
appears divided between a limited criminal jurisdiction over non-
capital crimes and a more general obligation to act as regulatory
agencies responsible for what Emory Washburn called the "pruden-
tial affairs" of county life.
2
Historians have studied these courts from several vantage
points. Often sessions courts have been seen as aspects of colonial
court systems, standing with their civil law counterparts, the
courts of common pleas, midway between the august superior
courts of judicature and the lowly courts held by individual magis-
trates. :' Some historians have emphasized their roles as enforcers of
colonial criminal law;'I others have looked to their significance as
* A. B. Carleton, J.D. New York University; graduate student in the his-
tory of American civilization at Brandeis University.
1. 1692-3 Acts and Resolves of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay,
c. 33; 1699-1700 Acts and Resolves, c. 1.
2. Emory Washburn, Sketches of the Judicial History of Massachusetts
(1840), p. 170; William E. Nelson, The Americanization of the Common
Law (1975), pp. 13-16; L. Kinvin Wroth and Hiller B. Zobel, editors, The
Legal Papers of John Adams 1 (1965), pp. xxviii-xliv.
3. Op. cit. supra note 2.
4. William E. Nelson, "Emerging Notions of Modern Criminal Law in the
Revolutionary Era: An Historical Perspective," 42 N. Y. U. L. Rev., 450
(1967); Julius Goebel, Jr. and T. Raymond Naughton, Law Enforcement in
Colonial New York (1944).
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judicial restraints on the exercise of governmental power. 5 To a
growing number of social historians the administrative powers of
the sessions courts provide one explanation for the emergence of
the magistracy as a county elite.'!
None of these treatments exhibit much concern for the integ-
rity of an institution. Historians have written about sessions courts
as aspects of larger structures or social networks. Yet what is most
apparent from a passing understanding of eighteenth century legal
thought is the degree to which local legal institutions were re-
garded as independent recipients of constitutional power and au-
thority. 7 The terms of a modern positivist jurisprudence that con-
siders law the command of a sovereign and unitary state have little
relevance to a sessions court of the mid-eighteenth century. It was
not as an aspect of a modern legal system-the public law analogue
of a private law court of common pleas-that eighteenth century
Americans viewed a sessions court. Nor did they see it as an ad-
ministrative agency or as a court for the control of administrative
action. The very notion of "Administration" as a specialized func-
tion of government would have had little meaning.
Colonial Americans thought of a sessions court as a court of
government that "conserved the peace." A sessions court was an
5. Nelson, op. cit. supra note 4, at pp. 13-15; Michael Zuckerman,
Peaceable Kingdoms (1970), at pp. 24-25 argues that county courts were an
ineffective counterweight to the political authority of the towns; but see
David G. Allen, "The Zuckerman Thesis and the Process of Legal Ration-
alization in Provincial Massachusetts," 29Wm. & Mary Quarterly (3rd ser.)
443 (1972), and L. Kinvin Wroth, "Possible Kingdoms: The New England
Town from the Perspective of Legal History," 15 Am. Jour. Leg. Hist. 318
(1971).
6. John M. Murrin, "Book Review," 9 History and Theory 226 (1972);
Ronald K. Snell, "The County Magistracy in Eighteenth Century Mas-
sachusetts: 1692-1750," (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Princeton Uni-
versity, 1971); Charles S. Sydnor, American Revolutionaries in the Making
(1952). For a later period see Robert M. Ireland, The County Courts of
Antebellum Kentucky (1972); Tadahisa Kuroda, "The County Court Sys-
tem of Virginia from the Revolution to the Civil War," (unpublished doctoral
dissertation, Columbia University, 1970); Charles S. Sydnor, The Develop-
ment of Southern Sectionalism 1819-1848 (1948).
7. John P. Reid, "In a Defensive Rage: The Uses of the Mob, the Justifica-
tion in Law, and the Coming of the American Revolution," 49 N. Y. U. L.
Rev. 1043, at pp. 1086-1091 (1974); Nelson, op. cit. supra note 4, at pp.
13-35. This eighteenth century perception is closely analogous to the insight
of modem legal anthropology that all societies have a multiplicity of legal
systems responsive to differing but overlapping publics. See Leo Pospisil,
The Anthropology of Law: A Comparative Theory (1971), pp. 98-126, and
Sally F. Moore, "Law and Social Change: the Semi-Autonomous Social
Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study," 7 Law & Society Rev. 710 (1973).
1976
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY
institution ofundifferentiated local governmental authority. In prac-
tice it made a single continuum of judicial action out of the dispa-
rate forms of criminal and administrative business that came be-
fore it, a continuum which made possible a judicial government of
county life. The responsibilities of a sessions court were defined less
by its formal legal jurisdiction than by the needs of governance. But
it lacked executive power. As a court, it could only govern insofar as
public business was brought before it. And so, it was dependent on
its attractiveness as a place where county problems might be
brought for resolution.
This article is based on the records of one such court, the
Middlesex County (Massachusetts) Court of General Sessions of the
Peace, over a 75-year period from 1728 to 1803.1 An intensive study
of these records reveals that during the second half of the
eighteenth century the conception of undifferentiated judicial gov-
ernment that underwrote the power of a sessions court over county
affairs gradually unravelled and was replaced by a modern concep-
tion of county government as an administrative agency. This trans-
formation stands in seemingly direct opposition to the ideological
and constitutional struggle of Revolutionary America to confirm
the independent authority of local institutions against the will of
the sovereign. Yet, this transformation was also the exact contem-
porary of that struggle.
In 1803 the Massachusetts legislature transferred the whole of
what we would consider the legal jurisdiction of the various county
sessions courts to the county courts of common pleas. The only
responsibilities still held by the collective body of the justices of the
peace were ones specifically related to county administration:
maintaining jails and other county buildings, settling county ac-
counts and raising taxes, granting licenses, and laying out, alter-
ing, and discontinuing highways. 9 The sessions courts had formally
become administrative agencies, the direct precursors of the boards
of County Commissioners who would later replace them.10
8. Out of the 75 years between 1728 and 1803, the whole record, plus all
relevant file papers were read for 16 years spaced at five year intervals.
Other parts of the record and file papers were read in a more cursory fash-
ion. All records are located in the large vault of the Middlesex County
Courthouse, East Cambridge, Massachusetts, under the supervision of the
Clerk of the Superior Court, Mr. Paul Sostek.
9. 1803 Acts and Resolves, c. 154.
10. The original sessions courts were abolished in 1807. 1807 Acts and
Resolves c. 11, as amended c. 57. For the next 20 years, the state ex-
perimented with a number of variants on the sessions court (see footnote
145, infra) until in 1828 the whole idea of a sessions court was replaced by
an administrative agency: the County Commissioners. 1827 Acts and Re-
solves c. 77.
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So ended the 110-year history of the Massachusetts courts of
general sessions of the peace. Founded with the Second Charter in
1692, they had survived the Revolution without significant legisla-
tive amendment. In fact, almost their whole history was marked by
a singular lack of legislative attention. Occasional acts were passed
specifying the terms of a particular criminal offense cognizable by
sessions courts, but until the late 1780's the General Court never
tried to direct the activities of the courts. The General Court could
indicate areas of province-wide concern through legislation which
the courts were bound to enforce. I" But, until well after the Revolu-
tion, neither the General Court nor the court system as a whole had
direct control over the activities of county sessions courts.12 The act
which first established these courts, after declaring that they could
hear any case relating to the conservation of the peace, made no
attempt to define what that meant. The remainder of the act was
limited to a schedule for the meetings of the various county courts
and descriptions of how appeals might be carried to the Superior
Court of Judicature, the process of jury selection, and the requisite
format for appeals from the criminal judgments of individual
magistrates. 13
11. See, for example, rules forbidding the killing of game out of season:
1698-9 Acts and Resolves, c. 21; 1716-17 Acts and Resolves, c. 12; 1738-9
Acts and Resolves, c. 3.
12. One might argue that because the concept of a sessions court, like
other local English legal institutions, was so well understood by English
colonials there would have been little need for legislative interference.
Goebel and Naughton in Law Enforcement in Colonial New York, for
example, regard an American sessions court as little but a replication of its
English namesake: the vehicle through which English justices became the
"administrators of England" after the Glorious Revolution. Yet the origins of
the Massachusetts sessions courts were mixed and we can trace significant
aspects of the structure and practice of the courts back to the county courts
of the Massachusetts Bay colony of the seventeenth century. Unlike their
English courterparts, provincial sessions courts rarely had to compete with
other local courts for control of a jurisdiction. See Sidney and Beatrice
Webb, The Parish and the County (1963); William Holdsworth, A History
of English Law, X (1938), pp. 126-339; Frederic W. Maitland, "The Shal-
lows and Silences of Real Life," Collected Papers, I (H.A.L. Fisher, ed.,
1911), p. 467. At the same time, the responsibilities of the Massachusetts
courts were far less extensive and elaborate than those ascribed to their
English counterparts. When a Massachusetts version of Bum's standard J.
P. treatise was prepared in the early 1770's, the editor had to make radical
excisions in the English text in order to make it acceptable for use in
America. An Abridgment of Burn's Justice of the Peace and Parish Officer
(J. Greenleaf, ed., 1773, Evans #12,702), introduction.
13. 1699-1700 Acts and Resolves, c. 1. Even those specifications in the
act meant less than one might think. Consider the appellate process. In all
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During the second half of the eighteenth century, the practice
of the Middlesex Sessions Court changed dramatically, The con-
tinuum of judicial government was broken; the distinction between
criminal prosecution and administrative regulation became in-
creasingly rigid and specific. Local criminal practice was inte-
grated into a state-wide system of criminal justice; county adminis-
tration came to be seen as the dependent agent of the Common-
wealth. Insofar as the court continued to administer county affairs,
it became less and less of a legal institution. And, by the turn of the
nineteenth century, the justices of the Middlesex Sessions Court
were functioning almost exclusively as limited administrators of
county affairs. A sense of general responsibility for county life had
given way before a bureaucratic model of county administration.
Such a transformation may have important implications for the
study of some of the loftiest themes of American legal and constitu-
tional history: the centralization of legal authority, the dichoto-
mous relationship of law and politics, the separation of powers. But
it is a transformation that grew out of mundane legal business: out
of fornication cases, road building and repair, poor relief, and a host
of other petty crimes and public concerns. In order to understand
how a court "conserved the peace" of a county and how that con-
ception of county government slowly changed, we need to look to
the business of such a court as a whole, to the interrelationships of
the issues that came before it, and to the functional integration of
its responses to those issues. We need, in effect, to think of a ses-
sions court as a distinct institution located in a particular com-
munity. A sessions court, like any court, was an entity whose "cen-
tral aspect" was ". . . organized activity, activity organized around
the cleaning up of some job." To borrow the terms of Karl Llewelyn,
civil or criminal cases, "appeal" meant not a review at a higher level of the
legal basis for a decision, but rather a new trial. Only in some regulatory
cases would a decision of the sessions court be reviewed on certiorari, and
even that was still a matter of some controversy when John Adams was
practicing. Legal Papers of John Adams, I, pp. 301-304, 321-322. In En-
gland the principles of certiorari were settled earlier. Edith Henderson,
Foundations of English Administrative Law (1963). But in mid-eighteenth
century America appeal still had less to do with the functional integration of
a legal system or the control of administrative discretion than with the
ability of litigants to change the legal level of their dispute. As such it re-
flects the intensity of local control over local legal institutions.
Moreover, while appeals to the Middlesex Sessions Court from the deci-
sions of justices of the peace were common, decisions of the sessions court
itself were rarely appealed to the Superior Court of Judicature. Between
1692 and 1705, three cases were appealed. In the 16 years studied between
1728 and 1803, only 20 cases were appealed; in six of those 16 years there
were no appeals taken at all.
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we may think of institutions of "law-government" as those institu-
tions which perform jobs necessary to the maintenance of group
life and order. 14 And in order to understand the legal life of a ses-
sions court of the eighteenth century we ought to specify the jobs
that court performed and the techniques it used. ",
The Middlesex County Court of General Sessions of the Peace
met alternately throughout the year in three county seats: Charles-
town, Cambridge, and Concord. 1' Most of the justices were laymen,
which was typical of the benches of most county courts in colonial
America. 7 Like the magistrates in other counties," many of the
Middlesex justices took their responsibilities to the sessions court
seriously, attending regularly and continuously over long periods of
time. ' The purpose of this study is not to argue that this court was
an archetypal sessions court. No doubt the putative typicality of the
Middlesex court was compromised by the strong competitive au-
thority of towns in Massachusetts. 20 At the same time, this article is
based on the assumption that by trying to describe the work of this
one court we can come to some understanding both of the strange-
ness of eighteenth century governmental practice and of the ways
this legal institution began to change into something more familiar.
Part One
FOUR ASPECTS OF THE BUSINESS OF THE PEACE, 1728-1803
What was a court that conserved the peace? An initial answer
might be that it was an informal, discretionary problem-solver-a
14. Karl N. Llewelyn, "Law and the Social Sciences - Especially Sociol-
ogy," 62 Harv. L. Rev., 1286, at p. 1289 (1949); for other statements of the
law-jobs theory see William Twining, Karl Llewelyn and the American
Realist Movement (1973), and Karl Llewelyn and Addison H. Hoebel, The
Cheyenne Way (1941).
15. This is not to underemphasize the importance of a self-conscious
legal tradition in the lives of colonists. Indeed, that tradition offers one
explanation for the ability of the court to govern the county through the use
of judicial forms and techniques. The value of the law-jobs approach, how-
ever, is that it directs us to the actual work of the institution instead of
looking endlessly at its membership and structure.
16. During the Revolution and for a short time thereafter, the court met
in Groton instead of Charlestown, where the courthouse had been burned by
the British.
17. A number of attorneys, notably Edmund Trowbridge and Jonathan
Sewall, were also Middlesex justices of the peace.
18. Snell, op. cit. supra note 6 (Suffolk and Hampshire Counties).
19. Several Middlesex justices - Thad Mason and Francis Foxcroft to
name two - were in continuous and regular attendance for up to 40 years.
20. Zuckerman, op. cit. supra note 5; Murrin, op. cit. supra note 6.
1976
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY
gathering of local notables who settled county affairs under the
guise of conducting a court. Yet, that is too cynical. The legal and
regulatory practice of a sessions court was.not a front. It was an
essential aspect of county governance, a set of tools that in large
part determined the work of the court. As those tools-those legal
categories-changed, so too did the nature of county government
change. But through the first half of the eighteenth century the
varying, seemingly dichotomous categories of the practice of a ses-
sions court were integrated into a unitary notion of government. In
Part Two of this article we will consider more directly the notion of
a judicial government of county life and the institutional context
which for a time at least gave it legitimacy. But here in Part One let
us look to the major categories of the business of the Middlesex
Sessions Court: liquor licensing, poor relief (settlement law), forni-
cation, and road building and repair. And let us consider how those
categories were used by the court to effect its mandate to conserve
the peace.
A. Liquor Licensing.
One of the seemingly routine tasks of the Middlesex Sessions
Court was the distribution and regulation of licenses for the inn-
keepers and liquor retailers of the county. 21 Each spring the clerk
of the court would send town selectmen a form with the names of
all holders of licensed public houses in the town; the selectmen
would be asked to return the form with the names of those persons
approved for the following year written on the back. Based on these
returns, the court would publish in late summer a list of all the
licenses granted or renewed throughout the county for the next
year. At other times during the year, persons might obtain a license
by special permission of the court.2 2 In all cases, licensees had to
post bond and find sureties to ensure the good order of their
houses. 2
3
At least through the first half of the eighteenth century, this
seemingly placid routine concealed a complex and continuing bat-
21. 1692-3 Acts and Resolves, c. 20.
22. See Petition of W. Willis, MGS Record, 9-28; usually such a petition
was based on the prior special authorization of the General Court.
Throughout this article MGS Record refers to the extended record books
kept by the clerks of the Middlesex sessions court and now housed in the
large vault in the Middlesex County Courthouse in East Cambridge. MGS
File Papers refers to the court papers kept in dated dockets - from 1737-8 to
1827-behind the glass cases along one wall of the same vault. File papers
from before 1737 are kept in indexed manila envelopes. See note 128, infra.
23. In 1728 the required bond was 250 pounds plus two sureties at 25
pounds each.
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tle between towns and the court which exercised a discretionary
control over who would be licensed. The justices did not simply
register the choices of the towns. They would vote on each name
presented before the court. And town selections were frequently
rejected.2 4
Not only were town choices often denied, but persons were reg-
ularly licensed who had not been approbated by a town and who in
fact had been explicitly rejected by the selectmen. In August 1743,
for example, the selectmen of Dracut were presented by the grand
jury for insulting the dignity of the court. It seems that, out of a
continuing sense of frustration, the selectmen had made the follow-
ing licensing return to the court, to which the justices strongly
objected:
• . . These may certify that we the subscribers (are the Same
that we was when the within named Robert was last licensed,
and that he is the Same, and if you Honours are the Same, we
expect the Same Fate: but) do except to [and] against the said
Robert Hildreth as a person unfit for the Business and imploy-
ment of an Innholder by reason that he doth not keep good Rule
[and] order in his House. 25
Towns were not in control of the situation. Towns presumably
had as great an interest as the court in the peace and order of tavern
life. But the court would pay as much attention to petitions of
private individuals or groups written either in opposition to particu-
lar town candidates or in support of persons passed over or rejected
by town selectmen as they would pay to the expressed desires of
towns. 26 Taverns were important centers of community life, and
we might imagine that the court listened with particular care to
petitions from isolated sections of a township. When the residents of
a "remote" part of Hopkinton heard that the town selectmen had
24. Votes were tallied anonymously on the backs of town returns and
petitions. It is impossible as a consequence to know whether justices
aligned themselves geographically or by some other criterion on whether to
grant or to withhold a license.
25. Presentment of the selectmen of Dracut, MGS File Papers, 8-43.
26. See for example, the petition of Francis Mooves, MGS File Papers,
1737-8 (no date), who "humbly shews that he has learnt the Art of Distilling
Spiritts but can't Set up that Business Without Liberty from this Court to
Sell the Same in Small Quantities. For there is no [one] that wants Twenty
Gallons of such Liquors at Once and therefore I must Either Loose the
Trade or the Benefit of Exercising it or must Sell without License and run
the Risove [risk of?] of being Prosecuted. Neither of which you Pet. is willing
to do . The court accepted his petition, and he was licensed in July
1738.
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refused to approbate their local innkeeper, a Mr. Quails or Quarles,
because he did not keep "Good Orders" on the Lords Day, they
wrote to the court to defend his actions. They all lived "Remote
from Meetting" with "nowhere to gow in the Intermishtion Sea-
son [winter] But to the Publick Hous. there being no other hous near
but what are thronged with . . . relations." An open and nearby
tavern was a necessity, particularly on Sundays, in a world of poor
roads and hard winters. And the court felt free to renew the license
of Mr. Quarles in spite of his apparent unGodly and unlawful con-
duct. 2
7
To the Middlesex Sessions Court licensing was a Xnatter of the
highest importance. The license was a declaration of public trust
and responsibility in a person-a declaration that a person could be
relied on to keep the public order of the county. Those who sold
liquor without a license flouted the authority of the court. 28 Those
licensees who did not keep good order violated a public trust.2 9 Both
were dealt with severely. The court felt no obligation to renew the
license of an innholder or retailer from year to year. The license was
an "office"; it was not the property of the licensee. It was a dele-
gated grant of authority to a specific person to keep a public house
in a specified place for a designated period of time.
As much, the process of liquor licensing exemplifies the gov-
ernmental authority of the sessions court. And so it remained in
Middlesex County into the 1750's. But by the late 1760's the process
had apparently changed. One cannot prove very much from an ab-
sence of information. But file papers conspicuously lack the sense
of conflict and strife that earlier characterized licensing returns.
Licensing had gradually become a routine process. Licensees were
able to hold on to their licenses for longer periods of time, and we
might suspect that they grew increasingly confident that their
licenses would be renewed yearly. By 1768, a license could move
with the holder to a new house 30 or be sold with an inn or store to a
previously unlicensed person.:" The license now belonged to the
licensee.
With the end of the Revolution, licensing procedures of the
Middlesex Sessions Court changed in more radical ways. The clerk
no longer recorded the yearly list of licenses in the extended record
of court business. Licenses were kept in a "minute" book with other
matters of presumably "non-legal" interest. And in 1786 the Gen-
27. MGS File Papers, 7-38.
28. See Martha Bowen, fined, MGS Record, 8-33.
29. See Opening of a Tavern (Martha'Bowen's house)., ibid., 7-33.
30. Petition of Edward Richards, ibid., 3-68; Petition of Esther Rand,
ibid.
31. Petition of Nathan Fuller, ibid.; Petition of Abijah Smith, ibid.
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eral Court made the choices of town selectmen obligatory on the
justices of the sessions courts.3 2 Decision-making power had been
shifted away from the members of the court.
By 1798 the court seemed reluctant to prosecute even those
presented for presuming to be a taverner without a license. Where
the court had once greeted such presentments with ten-pound
fines, the court now looked for excuses not to prosecute. Jonathan
Fay, the attorney for the Commonwealth, announced at the instiga-
tion of the court that he would only prosecute Samuel Tuttle insofar
as Tuttle had illegally sold one mug of liquor.33 And in the case of
Jepthah Richardson, Fay would not prosecute at all .3 4 Perhaps, as a
public institution, the Middlesex Sessions Court no longer wished to
stand in the way of a private individual's pursuit of his livelihood.
Such an extrapolation might bring us too close to an anarchic
capitalism presumably beyond the expectations of the men of the
sessions court. What had certainly happened, however, was that a
license had become private property. Previously, a public house
had been "public" in two senses: as a place open to the public and
as a public trust. But, by the 1780's and 1790's, the latter notion
had lost much of its force and the idea of a license came close to
implying a guarantee of a livelihood. In September 1783 the court
granted George Fretcham (or Feechum or Fecham), an innkeeper
imprisoned for debt, a writ of habeas corpus so that he "should be
present at the Court of General Sessions of the Peace . . . in order
to take out such a license to qualify him for an Innholder and also to
prevent others from taking license to his Great detriment [and] the
detriment of the public . . .,,. The government of the county
could not "take" a license from a person.:"; The license was an indi-
vidual's property, and it was not to be an instrument of public au-
thority.
At one time the justices of the Middlesex Sessions Court had
used licensing to enforce a complex vision of the good moral order
of the county. But as license holders gradually gained property
rights in their licenses, the court lost its former discretionary
power. A "legalized" license could not be used to serve govern-
mental ends. : 7 And, in the years after the Revolution, the Middlesex
Sessions Court became, in fact, a routine registrar of licenses.
32. 1786 Acts, c.68.
33. Commonwealth v. Samuel Tuttle, MGS Record, 5-98.
34. Commonwealth v. Jepthah Richardson, ibid., 11-98.
35. MGS File Papers, 9-83.
36. At least not without due compensation.
37. By the same token, an institution dedicated to those ends would not
be trusted with power in a society dedicated to the legalization of property
rights.
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B. Settlement and Poor Relief.
In England the law of settlement was a central aspect of the
jurisdiction of a sessions court. 38 Historians of provincial Mas-
sachusetts have usually looked to the town as the locus of poor
relief (and its avoidance); 39 yet in Middlesex County, as in the rest
of Massachusetts, the process of warning out a transient from a
town was dependent on the statutory authority of the sessions court
and the justices of the peace. If town selectmen, in their capacities
as overseas of the poor, decided to warn out a transient, they began
by writing out a warrant to the local constable ordering him to go
search out the individual and "warn" the transient "to depart out of
his or her House." Having done so, the constable would return the
warrant to the selectmen with the following notation on the back:
"I have warned the within named person . . . to depart out of this
Town . .. according to warrant." The completed warrant was
then sent to the sessions court with a petition that "this Caution
may be Entred at this Court so that s[ai]d . . . [person] may never
be any charge to the . . . town."'40 The court then entered the
"caution" of the town into its record, specifying if possible the
names of all children and dependents and the town from which the
transient(s) came. Only a recorded caution gave a town the right to
request a warrant from a magistrate that would order the direct
physical removal of a transient.
Poor relief and settlement law were complementary aspects of
a general process that defined and limited local responsibility for
dependent individuals. 4 ' From the perspective of the town, the ef-
fectiveness of that process depended on the sessions court, on the
power that the sessions court gave towns to control who would
qualify to receive their relief. Eighteenth century society operated
on a traditional principle that each community was responsible for
its own poor. 42 But in a society of growing geographical mobility
43 it
38. See Burrow's Settlement Cases: 1732-1776 (1777); Thomas Cal-
decott, Report of Cases Relative to the Duty and Office of a Justice of the
Peace, from Michaelmas Term 1776, inclusive to Trinity Term, 1785
(1786); citations in Legal Papers of John Adams, I, pp. 306-7.
39. See Zuckerman, op. cit. supra note 5, at p. 113; Josiah Benton,
Warning Out in New England (1911).
40. MGS File Papers, 5-38.
41. Another aspect of poor relief was the requirement that towns support
their aged, but only if no child or. grandchild were found to do so; see Petition
of Concord, MGS Record, 11-73.
42. See David Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum (1971), pp. 3-56.
43. See Douglas L. Jones, "Geographical Mobility and Society in
Eighteenth Century Essex County, Massachusetts," (unpublished doctoral
dissertation, Brandeis University, 1975).
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became increasingly important to distinguish those who were of the
community from those who did not belong. And the towns relied on
a statutory concept of "inhabitancy" as a way of determining eligi-
bility. "Inhabitancy" meant more than legal residence; one was
always an inhabitant of one's place of birth, at least until one
gained an inhabitancy elsewhere; but to become an inhabitant of
any other town became a more and more difficult process through
the eighteenth century. For 30 years after 1739 an inhabitancy
generally depended on the specific approval of the town meeting or
the overseers of the poor. 44 But the law was murky, and towns
appear to have been unsure whether the statutory definitions con-
stituted an adequate limitation of their responsibilities. 45 Thus they
relied on "warnings out", underwritten by the power of the sessions
court to authorize removal, as the only effective means of control-
ling their liability.
There was also a different and more important sense in which
the effectiveness of a settlement based system depended on the
intervention of the court. Each town was inevitably and under-
standably parochial in its desire to limit the costs of its responsibil-
ity, and each community would try to push the care of more or less
transient poor onto another community. The harshness of a warn-
ing out system was presumably mitigated by the fact that some
town somewhere would have to take in and care for the transient
poor; by definition everyone had an inhabitancy somewhere, no
matter how many towns from which an individual had been
warned out. The problem was that that inhabitancy might be virtu-
ally undiscoverable, particularly in a situation where there was no
incentive for a town to volunteer itself as a poor person's home. And
it was the responsibility of the court to find ways of allocating the
costs of poor relief between towns by "discovering" where an in-
habitancy lay.
In September 1758, for example, the Middlesex Sessions Court
heard a petition from the selectmen of Concord that Elisabeth
Parker, a poor woman with an infant child, had been transported to
Concord from Groton. She was not, the selectmen declared, a
proper resident of Concord, and they asked that Groton reimburse
them for the costs of care and that Elisabeth Parker and her child
be returned to Groton. In an attempt to resolve the dispute, the
justices of the court asked themselves whether Elisabeth Parker
44. 1738-9 Acts and Resolves, c.9.
45. Retrospectively, the best evidence for their insecurity was the large
numbers of towns in Middlesex County which continued to warn out new-
comers even after the act of 1767 (c.17) had effectively made warnings out
unnecessary since the burden of discovery had been placed on the tran-
sients themselves.
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had lived in Concord long enough to subject Concord to liability for
her support and that of her child. They decided that she had not,
but they were equally unwilling to draw the apparent legal conclu-
sion that Groton should therefore be made responsible for the past
and future care of the mother and child. The court seemed to be
saying that there was no resolution to the problem, and it "con-
tinued" its consideration of the case.
And in the records of the court for March 1759 we can read that
because of the dilemma created by the court's earlier refusal to
make an effective decision Elisabeth and her child had lived in the
Concord House of Correction at the county's expense since the pre-
vious September. She remained unemployed, and all efforts to dis-
cover her "true" inhabitancy had failed. The court therefore de-
cided that she should be discharged from confinement, and the
town of Concord was ordered to take responsibility for her well be-
ing. It was, said the court,
the incumbent Duty of the Selectmen or Overseers of the Poor
of any Town in which an Indigent Person resides to afford to
Such Person Such Relief as is necessary whether such person
be an Inhabitant ... or otherwise. And the town of Concord
would be chargeable for whatever was not covered by her earn-
ings until the Town to which she properly belong be ascer-
tained.
46
The court's ultimate decision to put the cost of supporting Elisabeth
Parker and her child "temporarily" on the town of Concord may
have been the consequence of considerable testimony that she had
been an intermittant resident of Concord since 1740, although she
had been properly warned out of both Concord and Groton. For our
purposes, however, it is most important to note both that the court
was the one institution mandated to deal with the kinds of inter-
town conflict engendered by the warning out process and that the
court constructed a solution which had less to do with abstract legal
right than with the concrete political necessity of maintaining a
system of poor relief.
At the same time, removal cases rarely came to trial in
Middlesex County before the 1760's. 47 We might guess that persons
were usually not removed from the towns they had been warned out
of unless the justification for the removal was incontestable. But it
is also likely that informal arrangements existed between the towns
of the county, partially bypassing the court, that allocated respon-
46. Concord v. Groton, MGS Record and File Papers, 9-58 and 3-59.
47. Years in which the court decided removal cases included 1738(1),
1758(2), 1763(1), 1768(4), 1773(1).
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sibility for transient poor. Indirect evidence for such a hypothesis
can be drawn from a number of sources. One of the only pre-1758
removal cases to appear before the court was brought by the town of
Reynham, which would not have been able to participate in any
extra-judicial arrangements because of its distance from Middlesex
County. 49 In the case of Elisabeth Parker, discussed above, Groton
supported Elisabeth while Concord maintained the child after she
had been removed with her infant to Concord. Only when that sup-
port was no longer forthcoming from Groton did Concord press
suit. 49 And finally we should note a case in 1758 involving a petition
by the town of Weston that a poor woman and child living in
Waltham had been so badly neglected that the overseers of the poor
of Weston had had to spend an "excessive" amount for their sup-
port. The fact that the town of Weston was supporting residents of
Waltham was not in itself a cause for complaint."'
Within such an informal system, there would have been a place
for the sessions court, if only as a final-though rarely used-
decisionmaker, but its practical role was quite limited. The "cau-
tions" listed by the court were not active instruments of the power
and authority of the court. In contrast to the jealously guarded
county prerogative of liquor licensing, "warnings out" remained a
symbol of the discretionary authority of town selectmen. The pur-
pose of a yearly licensing return was merely to advise the court of a
town's wishes in a matter of common concern; the purpose of a
petition that a town's "cautions" be entered into the court record, by
contrast, was to control the size and constitution of the town's own
corporate membership. And we may well imagine that the court
would hesitate to set itself up as a regular arbiter of who was and
who was not of a particular local community. It is evident that poor
people were not the only ones warned out of towns. Until 1767 each
town could develop its own criteria for who was to be warned out,
and some towns warned out all newcomers, including men with
slaves and large property holders. None of these cautions were ever
rejected by the court; the court automatically entered a caution into
its record.
A caution, moreover, did not mean that the person cautioned
against was routinely forced to leave his or her home. Rather, the
power the caution invested in the selectmen was probably per-
ceived as a kind of reserve. A person once cautioned "may never be
48. Reynham v. Hopkinton, MGS Record, 3-38.
49. Concord v. Groton, ibid., 9-58.
50. Weston v. Waltham, ibid., 12-58; the file papers of this case suggest a
rather horrible story of two transients being moved back and forth between
two towns without clothing or even food; MGS File Papers, 12-58.
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any charge" to the town from which he or she had been cautioned.
But individuals were rarely forced to leave, except at the point
when they actually became dependent and required the assistance
of the community. 51
Whatever the truth of this hypothesis of a partially informal
system of poor relief and administration, it is clear that, during the
15 years immediately preceeding the Revolution, settlement cases
did become an important and regular part of the business of the
court. We might assume that growth in the quantitative level of
transiency, a growth Douglas Jones ascribes to a gradual process of
modernization, was at the root of the change..5 2 Between 1728 and
1763, while the population of Middlesex County probably doubled,
the number of cautions entered for a year grew from six individuals
and three households in 1728 to 233 individuals and 118 house-
holds in 1763. And since a caution once entered was permanent in
its potential implications, the latter figure surely underestimates
the actual growth in the numbers of persons and families in the
county "at risk" as a consequence of having.been warned out of a
town.
Perhaps the sheer numbers of persons labelled transients com-
bined with the growing economic inequality of the society broke
down the private and informal arrangements that might have pre-
viously existed between towns.5 3 In any event, settlement cases
assumed an increasingly legalistic tone. Costs of suit were high.
The court made its decisions without a jury. And cases were re-
solved into a series of legal-factual queries which the justices posed
themselves,' 4 which in their increasing technicality and abstrac-
tion typify the growing rigor of settlement law. Where the questions
asked in Concord v. Groton in 1758 were directly factual, in 1768
the court asked itself whether a warning directed against a whole
family was adequate as to any single member of that family, 55
whether a warrent ordering removal of a transient could be issued
by a justice who was a resident of the town requesting the war-
rant, 56 whether a boy gained an inhabitancy in a town in which he
had been apprenticed (or did he retain the inhabitancy of his father
51. See Woburn v. Lexington, MGS Record, 3-68.
52. Jones, op. cit. supra note 43.
53. See James Henretta, "Economic Development and Social Structure
in Colonial Boston," Colonial America, Stanley Katz, ed. (1971), 450.
54. See Concord v. Groton, MGS Record, 9-58.
55. Woburn v. Lexington, MGS Record and File Papers, 3-68.
56. Natick v. Medway, ibid.; see also the Legal Papers of John Adams, I,
pp. 299-319.
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throughout his apprenticeship), 57 and whether failure by a town to
win a settlement suit against one town precluded it from suing
another town .51
Consider the case of Mary Powers. In 1739, when she was
either three or five years of age, she left Boston with her mother
Anna to join John Macklewain, who may have been her father, in
Lexington. They were immediately "warned out" and moved to
Woburn where John married Anna and where they all lived for
about seven years. In the fall of 1746 they moved back to
Lexington, from which they were again warned out by the consta-
ble. Mary, however, remained in Lexington, and in 1766, nearly 20
years after she had last been "cautioned," the town selectmen
applied for a warrant to remove Mary from Lexington. The warrant
was granted, and Mary was taken to Woburn, whose selectmen
petitioned the court that she be sent back to Lexington and that the
town of Lexington reimburse Woburn for the costs of her care.
The only question the court raised was whether the caution
entered in 1746 against "John Macklewain and his family" was
sufficient as to Mary. And once that issue was resolved in
Lexington's favor, Woburn had no other grounds to contest her re-
moval. A warning once entered into the records of the court would
retain its potency in spite of the permanency of the transient cau-
tioned against. Mary had lived in Lexington continuously from
1746 until she was removed. She had spent the better part of her
life in the town. But that fact was irrelevant to the legitimacy of her
removal.5 9
To a degree settlement cases reflect the growing Anglicization
of the legal practice of the province. Technical, legal cases of the
sort described above had been typical of the business of English
county courts for some time, 60 and perhaps the justices of
Middlesex County were trying to model themselves on their English
counterparts by taking a more direct interest in the poor relief of the
county.6' These cases also demonstrate something of the growing
57. Stoneham v. Framingham, MGS Record, 12-68; this case was com-
plicated by the fact that James Holden's father was non compos, and his
apprenticeship had been arranged and ordered by the selectmen of
Stoneham.
58. Natick v. Newton, ibid., 3-68.
59. Woburn v. Lexington, ibid., 3-68.
60. See Burrows Settlement Cases: 1732-1776 (1777).
61. As a young lawyer, John Adams made a rather careful study of Eng-
lish settlement law. And we can assume that he was not alone; settlement
law was an important aspect of the training of any lawyer, and the justice of
the peace manuals of Dalton and Nelson, and later Bums, that devoted
many pages to problems of settlement and poor relief were among the first
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control lawyers exercised over the legal system. Towns were in-
evitably represented by counsel during the 1760's and 1770's, often
by ambitious and distinguished members of the Massachusetts
bar. 6'1 And the technicality of these settlement cases may be one
manifestation of the professionalization and growing technical
competence of the lawyers of the province.6"
Yet, in a society in which population and -geographic mobility
were increasing rapidly, such a legalistic approach to the allocation
of poor relief would have only a limited future. A determination of
proper inhabitancy by a sessions court could settle intertown dis-
putes only so long as towns continued to exercise moral and legal
authority over their inhabitants and so long as the governmental
authority of a sessions court was unquestioned. But after the be-
ginning of the Revolution, removal cases no longer appeared before
the Middlesex sessions court. And with the Constitution of 1780 the
locus of responsibility for public welfare slowly shifted to the Com-
monwealth. A 1788 act directed all disputes concerning the support
of the poor to the courts of common pleas, where they rapidly be-
came an ever more technical branch of town law. 64 A year later the
legislature presented a definition of "settlement' that clearly
excluded sessions courts from any role in its application.
65 Most
interestingly of all, in 1791 the legislature resolved that in future
all corporations involved with the care of the poor in Massachusetts
would have to contract directly with the state. 66 Towns retained a
basic obligation to care for their poor and dependent, but it was in-
creasingly an administrative responsibility based on the authority
and the participation of the state.17 The law of settlement and the
law books published in the colonies. In terms of the Middlesex court, how-
ever, the most important evidence for regarding the poor relief practice of
the 1760's and 1770's as an aspect of what has been called the Anglicization
of the Province is the existence of settlement cases. Presumptively some
kind of procedure must have existed prior to the late 1750's to deal with
intertown disputes over inhabitancy and dependency. But such a procedure,
whatever it was, did not rely on the forms of English local government law.
The cases heard by the court in the 1760's and 1770's did.
62. Jonathan Sewall and John Adams were frequently the contending
counsel in settlement cases in Middlesex County. See Woburn v.
Lexington, for example, MGS Record, 3-68.
63. John M. Murrin, "The Legal Transformation: the Bench and Bar of
Eighteenth Century Massachusetts," Colonial America, Katz, editor, 415.
64. 1788 Acts, c.61; see for example Town of Freeport v. Town of
Edgecumbe, 1 Mass. Rep. 458 (1805), and Town of Topsham v. Town of
Harpswell, 1 Mass. Rep. 517 (1805).
65. 1789 Acts, c.14.
66. 1791 Resolves (May), c.92.
67. 1793 Acts, c.59.
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administration of poor relief had become conceptually separate
categories of governmental work. Poor relief was becoming ratio-
nalized into a larger administrative structure, and in that structure
,the sessions court had no place.
C. Fornication.
By every quantitative measure, fornication was the most im-
portant aspect of the criminal business of a sessions court through-
out the history of provincial Massachusetts. 6 Over 40 percent of all
prosecutions sampled for this study (including those that occurred
in the 1780's and 1790's when fornication cases no longer appeared
before sessions courts) were for fornication, and well over half of all
the misdemeanants punished by the Middlesex court were for-
nicators. The crime was prosecuted almost three times more fre-
quently than offenses against the Sabbath, which was the second
most prosecuted category, and over six times as many persons were
punished for fornication as were punished for violating a Sabbath
rule. But even these measures underestimate the increasing rela-
tive significance of fornication in the Revolutionary period. While
prosecutions for fornication remained roughly constant, prosecu-
tions for other crimes dropped precipitously. In 1733 the court
heard 67 criminal cases of which 26 were for fornication; in 1768 it
heard 27 cases of which 20 were for fornication. And by 1783 the
court prosecuted only three cases that were not for fornication. In a
sense, fornication had become the only regular criminal business of
the court.'"'
It is easy to appreciate the usefulness and significance of
fornication prosecutions in a "puritanical" society. Sexual im-
morality challenged the moral order of community and family life.
The existence of bastards and of children born within nine
months of marriage"' was a visible contradiction of the sacraments
of marriage. 7' Moreover, a bastard born to a mother who could not
support him or her would have to be supported by the town in which
68. 1692-3 Acts and Resolves, c.18; Nelson, op. cit. supra note 2, at p.
37.
69. Apparently, this relative growth in fornication prosecutions had al-
ready begun in the early eighteenth century; Snell, op. cit. supra note 6, at
pp. 155-184.
70. As a general rule only fornicators who produced children were prose-
cuted, although the death of a child at birth would not free the parents from
criminal responsibility.
71. Fornication was of course not the only area of court business that
interacted with church affairs. To take only one example, the court oversaw
towns in their obligation to maintain a minister. See Petition of Reverend
Swift (Framingham refused to support him adequately), MGS Record, 5-38.
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the child was born, whether or not the mother had a settlement in
the town. Towns might be faced with growing costs that resulted
from the immoral behavior of strangers. And fornication prosecu-
tions were the only possible deterrent.
For most of the first half of the eighteenth century there is
much evidence to indicate that fornication prosecutions were used
to secure primarily religious and deterrent ends. During the 1720's
and 1730's over 50 percent of all fornication prosecutions were
against couples who had produced a child within nine months of
their marriage. In 1728 seven-eighths of the fornication cases
heard by the Middlesex court charged "fornication before mar-
riage." All those who could be shown to have engaged in sexual
immorality would be punished. Throughout this period it was con-
ventional for the court to prosecute both husband and wife. At the
same time, the court used its fines to distinguish between those
who married and "saved the town" from any charge and those who
did not. In spite of the fact that a fine would presumably be a
greater burden on a young singlewoman than on a married couple,
the fines for fornication before marriage would almost always be
lower than those for fornication without marriage. In 1733, for
example, fines for fornication before marriage averaged 17.5 shil-
lings less than fines assigned to singlewomen.
Sometime during the 1740's, however, the nature of a fornica-
tion prosecution in Middlesex County began to change. Men were
no longer prosecuted for the crime of fornication, although they
were sued for bastardy. The number of women prosecuted for forni-
cation before marriage declined similarly. From 1743 on, such
prosecutions never constituted as much as ten percent of the forni-
cation cases heard by the court in a year, and in most years the
court heard no such cases at all. 72 In effect, only singlewomen with
bastards were being prosecuted for fornication.
As the defendants in fornication cases became uniform, so did
the fines charged the convicted. Where in 1733 fines had averaged
over three pounds and had ranged as high as five pounds, by 1743
fines averaged only one pound and ranged from five shillings to two
and one-half pounds. And in the years studied after 1743 the fines
charged by the court continued to decline. In 1768 fines averaged a
little more than five shillings and ranged only between one and ten
shillings; and in 1773 the sessions court charged a uniform four-or
five-shilling fine for the crime of fornication. In 1733 fornication
had been punished with greater severity than obstruction of justice,
72. We might suspect that married women were prosecuted only when it
was believed that their children were conceived with someone other than
their husbands.
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violations of the Sabbath, gaming, drunkenness, and assault; in
1738, attempted rape was treated as a less serious offense than
fornication. By contrast, after 1768, fornication was always the
least seriously punished of all the crimes sentenced by the
Middlesex court.
We cannot know exactly why the structure of fornication prose-
cutions changed so dramatically. The changes were not the product
of legislation. And while we know that between 1761 and 1800 an
unprecedented 33.7 percent of all first births in families in a variety
of Massachusetts communities occurred within nine months of
marriage, 73 it is not at all obvious what consequences that fact
would have on the criminal practice of the Middlesex sessions
court.
Although we cannot be certain of the causes of change, we can
know what the results of those changes were. Fornication prosecu-
tions continued to serve the governmental aims of the court, but,
during the second half of the eighteenth century, fornication prose-
cutions had only a residual moralistic purpose. 74 Fornication prose-
cutions were largely reconstructed as a form of public welfare law.
They became a way of allocating the costs of illegitimacy. After
1758 towns had the right to bind out into servitude any woman with
a bastard who refused "to reimburse or procure the reimbursement
of charge or expense..." of raising her child. 75 Since the only way a
woman could legally compel a man to support his bastard (in a suit
for bastardy) was by first confessing to fornication, we can assume
that there was a substantial inducement to confessions. And it is
evident that the vast majority of all women accused of fornication
73. Daniel S. Smith and Michael S. Hindus, "Premarital Pregnancy in
America, 1640-1966: An Overview and Interpretation," 5 Jour. of Inter-
disciplinary Hist, 537 (1975); Daniel S. Smith, "The Dating of the Sexual
Revolution," The American Family in Socio-Historical Perspective
Michael Gordon, ed. (1973), p. 323.
74. In his article, "Emerging Notions of Modern Criminal Law in the
Revolutionary Era: An Historical Perspective," (pp. 453-4), William Nelson
has argued that the prevalence of fornication prosecutions in preRevolu-
tionary Middlesex County demonstrates a continuing moralistic- even Puri-
tanical - impulse that stands in direct contrast with the economic concern
with theft that dominated post-Revolutionary criminal justice. As we have
seen, such a position can only be maintained in ignorance of the degree of
change in the structure of fornication prosecutions between the early
eighteenth century and the 1750's and 1760's. Most importantly, such an
argument depends on an untenable comparison of pre- and post-
Revolutionary criminal justice "systems". Until well after the Revolution, the
misdemeanors heard by a sessions court were not part of a provincial or
state-wide system, but aspects of local governance and order.
75. 1758-9 Acts and Resolves, c.17
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confessed their guilt long before their children were due. 76 Fornica-
tion cases became a kind of registration procedure whose purposes
were only coincidentally related to the punitive assumptions of the
criminal law. A fornication case was less a criminal prosecution
than a part of an administrative process designed to redistribute the
costs of maintaining dependent bastards.
To understand how a fornication case was used to perform an
administrative task we should begin by identifying three competing
interests in such a case: the town, the mother, and the "putative"
father. The child had no direct interest in the case since someone,
whether town or family, would always be responsible for the costs
of his or her care. But each of the others had a distinct stake in the
resolution of the process. And it was the responsibility of the jus-
tices and juries of the court to underwrite a process that would
distribute the costs of main taining bastards.
The overt motivation of the town was obvious: it was to avoid
having to support a child out of its public funds. 7'1 And, from a
certain perspective, it might be said that the whole process of a
fornication case was designed to insure the town against the cost of
raising the illegitimate children of resident women. Whether or not
the court "adjudged" any particular man to be the father of a child,
someone would have to put up a bond and find sureties "to save the
town harmless from any charge" for the cost of raising the bastard.
If no man were found or convicted, the father or brother of the
woman would post the recognizance.7 9 If the woman were a "trans-
76. See the case of Esther Bemis in text above footnote 91, infra.
77. As such, the practice of the Middlesex court came to approximate
English models for the treatment of bastards. In Blackstone, although for-
nication was considered as part of a general category of crimes against God
and morality, the actual description of the offense was solely in govern-
mental terms. Punishment was mandated for the woman, but only "if the
bastard becomes chargeable to the parish: for otherwise the very mainte-
nance of the child is considered as a degree of punishment." William
Blackstone, Commentaries, IV (1767), p. 65.
The point is not that there was no element of retribution or religious belief
in fornication prosecutions of the second half of the eighteenth century, or
conversely that earlier cases may not also have served an administrative
purpose. Rather, it is that the common meaning of a fornication case in the
context of the larger practice of tile court changed over time, and that the
process was changed in order to accomodate that new meaning.
78. The town may also have had a continuing concern for the threat to
peace and order represented by bastard children. But that concern, if felt,
was not expressed in the records and file papers.
79. See the Bonds of John Harrington and Eliakin Rice, MGS Record,
4-58, and the Bond of Anthony Jones, MGS File Papers, 11-68, who "has
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ient" of whatever duration, she would be removed as soon as her
pregnancy became obvious."°
The interests of the woman were also secured by the court pro-
cess. A man convicted of bastardy under the relevant statute,1 had
to pay half the costs of the mother's "lying-in", which included the
costs of the birth and all expenses incurred by the mother during
the first month of the baby's life, generally two shillings per week
thereafter, 82 all costs incurred by the mother while prosecuting her
claim against him," a bond with sureties-usually of 50 or 100
pounds-to ensure performance of the court's order, and a similar
bond to protect the town from cost. To all this the woman could lay
claim by implicating a man in her confession. And fornication con-
fessions were almost always the consequence of a voluntary
examination before a single justice in which primary attention was
paid to the identity of the father.4 We might say that the fine ulti-
mately paid by the mother to the sessions court was less a punish-
ment than a fee paid to invoke the power of the county to secure the
support of a putative father .'5
given Security to the Selectmen of the Town of Hopkinton to their Satisfac-
tion for all Charge that may Arise by a male child Born of his Daughter..."
80. Some of the settlement cases heard by the court dealt with women
who were about to have babies at the time of their removal. In at least one
case the dispute between towns was complicated by the fact that in the
process of being removed from one town to a second town a woman gave
birth to a child in a third town. Reading v. Framingham, MGS Record,
12-63. The woman in this case was married, but since her husband (James
Holden) was destitute, the third town would have had to support her child as
if the child had been born illegitimate.
Five years after Reading v. Framingham James Holden and his family
were again removed from Framingham, this time to Stoneham. It appears
from the file papers that the impetus for this second removal was the fact
that Holden was being sued for bastardy in New Hampshire. Presumably if
the woman in New Hampshire won her suit, the town of his inhabitancy
would have had to maintain her child since James Holden was still desti-
tute. Stoneham v. Framingham, MGS Record and File Papers, 12-68.
81. 1692-3 Acts and Resolves, c. 18, section 5.
82. Earlier in the century the charge might have been as high as five
shillings per week. See Gleason v. Rice, MGS Record, 12-33.
83. Whether this included the actual fine she had to pay is unclear from
the available file papers.
84. Any single woman might submit to voluntary examination but could
not be compelled to testify before the child was born (presumably because
the child might still be born legitimate). See Burn's Justice of the Peace
and Parish Officer, p. 56.
85. Women paid fines even when children were born dead. One reason
they did so was because payment of the fine entitled a woman to sue (for
1976
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Against the compelling interests of the town and the convicted
fornicatress it would seem that an accused father-a man accused
of bastardy-had very little chance. To be an "adjudged" father was
to be placed at severe cost. 6 Moreover, the evidence needed to ad-
judge a man the father of an illegitimate child was far less than
what we would today consider necessary for a paternity conviction.
In general, only two kinds of evidence were needed: the accusa-
tion of the mother under oath and a deposition by a midwife or other
woman present at the birth testifying to the fact that the mother
had named the accused man while in the midst of labor. 7 In the
case of Cutler v. Hastings, for example, Mary Cutler confessed to
fornication and charged Sam Hastings with being the father of her
child. At trial, upwards of a dozen depositions were filed by men
who admitted to having had sexual intercourse with Mary or who
had watched her have intercourse with others. "She was," said one
deponent, "common to every one to Do what they pleased to her."
bastardy) to recover the costs incident to childbirth. See Millicent Russell,
fined, MGS Record, 5-63.
86. A man's responsibility to pay half the costs of a lying-in would seem to
offer the fornicatress an opportunity to enjoy a level of luxury that she could
not otherwise have indulged herself. In August 1743 Mary Cheeney sent
Richard King the following bill for her lying-in:
To Child Bed Linen ......................... /10/
To Bringing the midwife and women ...... 1/10/
To m idwife fees ............................... 1/
To Lhouger [lager beer?] ...................... 2/
To biscake .................................... 1/
To entertaining the women ................... 2!
To otem eal ................................... /5/
To rice and chocolat .......................... 1/
To Rum and Spribes [spirits] ............... 1/19/
T o spices ..................................... /6/
To norsing ................................. 3/
To bording the nors ........................... 2/
To fire and candles ........................ 2/10/
All of which came to 28 pounds for which Richard King would have been
charged fourteen pounds. The court in this case disallowed the lhouger,
biscakes, the entertainment of women, the rice and chocolate, and the rum
and spribes as excessive and awarded her ten pounds, five shillings, and six
pence. MGS File Papers, 8-43.
87. The act creating the jurisdiction of the sessions courts over bastardy
stated that a man would be adjudged the father when the mother continued
"constant in such accusation being examined upon oath and put upon the
discovery of the truth in the time of her travail. 1692-3 Acts and Re-
solves, c. 18.
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And another deposition asserted that at one time Mary had tried to
induce an abortion. The only depositions which directly implicated
Sam were filed by Mary's mother and sister. Even the midwife ad-
mitted that during labor (travail) Mary had only accused Sam after
much prompting from her mother. Still, the court adjudged Sam
Hastings to be the father of Mary Cutler's child and ordered him to
pay one half the cost of her lying-in and two shillings per week
thereafter and to post two bonds to secure his performance of. the
court order and to protect the town."' It may be that the depositions
introduced at Sam Hastings' trial constituted an obvious conspir-
acy to discredit Mary Cutler, or it may be that there was other
evidence which is lost to us. We cannot judge the veracity of a
200-year-old deposition. For our purposes, though, the point is that
Mary Cutler did not have to prove that Sam Hastings was the only
man who could have been the father of her child. All she had to
show was that she had had intercourse with him and that she be-
lieved him to be the father of her child. And the only substantive
defense a man could raise against a bastardy accusation was that
he had never had intercourse with his accuser."9
Presumably it was the "policy" of the court to identify putative
fathers in order to force them to assume the costs of providing for
their illegitimate children. 90 And we might assume that the means
used for effecting that policy was the bastardy trial. Yet, through-
out all of the 16 years of court business examined for this paper only
16 bastardy cases at all were heard by the sessions court; in only
two years (1733 and 1768) were there as many as three such trials.
Given the concerns of the court and the interests of the town and
mother, one might well wonder why there were so few.
well wonder why there were so few.
The answer is that most men were willing to work out private
arrangements with both town and mother in order to avoid the cost
and public exposure of a trial. If a man came to a satisfactory
agreement with both other parties, no trial would be held. The court
was uninterested in the public declaration of guilt or innocence. Its
concern was with the orderly perpetuation of a system for the sup-
port of bastards. And just as there were incentives for women to
88. Cutler v. Hastings, MGS Record and File Papers, 9-53.
89. In Fisher v. Kneeland, ibid., 3-61, the court adjudged Kneeland
guilty "nothing being offered appearing to the Court to induce them to think
him innocent."
90. It is not at all clear that the magistrates even cared if the mothers of
illegitimate children consciously looked to the wealth of their "suitors" in
order to decide whom they would accuse. See depositions in Boone v.
Wheeler, ibid., 3-61 and Gage v. Headly, ibid., 9-68, and Legal Papers of
John Adams, I, pp. 325-329.
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confess and to identify their lovers, so the court utilized a process
which was designed to encourage men to arrive at a private under-
standing with the other parties to a fornication case. How it did so
may be gathered from an examination of the chronology of an ordi-
nary fornication case.
On September 20, 1782, Esther Bemis of Waltham went to the
home of James Dix, J.P., in order to be voluntarily examined. She
was pregnant, and her child was "likely to be born a Bastard and to
be chargeable to the town of Waltham ... and Ebenezer Swan jun.
late of Cambridge ... Blacksmith, now said to be Resident in Salem
... is the father of said Child and [Esther] prays that he may be
dealt with according to Law." Dix then made out a warrant to the
sheriff, deputy sheriff, or constable of Cambridge ordering the ap-
prehension of Swan so that he could be made to post bond for his
appearance at the sessions court.
That same day the undersheriff reported that after "diligent"(?)
search he had been unable to find Ebenezer Swan who had "es-
caped" to Essex County. Five days later, another justice of the
peace, presumably from Essex County, wrote another warrant for
the sheriffs of Essex County and the constable of Salem.
On September 29, Swan was "captured" and taken before John
Pickering, J.P., in Salem, who ordered that Swan be conveyed to
Middlesex County. But on September 28 (at least according to the
file papers), Swan had already been taken before James Sullivan, a
magistrate from Middlesex County, who had ordered him to put up
bond of 200 pounds and to find sureties for a similar sum for his
appearance before the Middlesex Sessions Court. This bond was
renewed in December for his appearance at trial the following year.
Meanwhile, Esther Bemis had posted a ten-pound bond with an
equal surety for her appearance at court. But on May 9, 1783 she
sent the following receipt to the court:
Received of Ebenezer Swan jun. the Sum of thirty pounds Law-
ful money, which is in full of all Demands I have upon him
relating to a child I have charged him with being the Father of
[and] I also discharge the said Ebenezer Swan jun. from all
bonds, [and] all charges that may hereafter answer relating to
said child ...
And on June 3, 1783, Esther Bemis was fined six shillings and costs
(which came to ten shillings and six pence) by the sessions court for
fornication. No man was charged in the record of the court with
being the father of her child."
91. Esther Bemis, fined, ibid., 6-83.
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For Ebenezer Swan the rewards of coming to a private agree-
ment with Esther Bemis were tangible.!' He was free not just of the
costs of prosecution but also of the recognizances and the continu-
ing charges which a bastardy trial would have probably imposed.
Moreover, he was never publicly charged; the fact that he had
fathered a bastard could remain unacknowledged.
93
There remained of course a number of bastardy cases, but these
were less criminal prosecutions to establish the legal guilt of a man
than attempts by accused men to prove their innocence of charges.
In a sense they most resemble libel proceedings in which a man
stood as a plaintiff hoping to prove that he had been wronged by the
woman who had accused him. Because of the evidentiary burden a
man had to overcome, these cases were often ones in which the
man had direct evidence of his own innocence."w, a And in every case
his goal was to keep the woman from being allowed to take her oath
and give evidence. In Gage v. Headly, John Adams, who acted as
Josiah Headly's attorney, introduced evidence to prove that Lydia
Gage was an unstable and unchaste woman, that she had accused
several other men at the same time that she accused Headly and in
fact could not make up her mind, that she accused Headly only
because he had money, and that one of the other men she had
previously charged might have blackmailed her. Against these
claims, Lydia Gage's attorney introduced evidence that Headly had
repeatedly tried to bribe her not to name him and that many
townsmen of Lincoln had suspected that Gage and Headly were
sleeping together. The court decided that Lydia should not be "ad-
mitted" to her oath, and Josiah was adjudged innocent of her ac-
cusation. 4
92. We might assume that Swan had also reached an informal agreement
with the town. In other cases file papers sometimes included either an oral
(witnessed) or a written certification of satisfaction from the town.
93. There seems to have been a kind of progression of sanctions from
unacknowledged agreement to bastardy trial. If, as in the case of Esther
Bemis, the man made a settlement prior to trial he would not be named at
all. If such an agreement were not complete at trial, the woman's charge
would be recorded; however, even in most of the latter cases, no bastardy
trial would ensue. Perhaps the public record of the charge acted as an in-
centive for the man to reach a settlement with town and mother in order to
avoid further public exposure. Occasionally the court would order a man so
charged to put up bond to protect the town from charge, even though there
was no bastardy trial. We might guess that in that situation the man had
reached an agreement with the woman without coming to a similar under-
standing with the town. See Mary Hayden, fined (bond of William Toy),
MGS Record, 9-68.
93a. Boone v. Wheeler, MGS Record and File Papers, 3-61.
94. Gage v. Headly, ibid., 9-68; Legal Papers ofJohn Adams, I, pp. 325-329.
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During the second half of the eighteenth century, the various
aspects of the law of fornication were integrated by the Middlesex
sessions court into an administrative process of increasing effi-
ciency and rationality. The costs of prosecution, which had once
depended on variables of time and distance, were gradually re-
duced. The punitive functions of a criminal law all but disappeared
as fornication prosecutions became routinized and almost bureau-
cratic. In 1785 the General Court passed "An Act for the Punish-
ment of Fornication, and for the Maintenance of Bastard Children,"
which, after restating the older punishments that the law of 1692
had mandated, announced that any woman guilty of fornication
could choose to appear before a justice of the peace and pay him
directly six shillings for a first offense or twelve shillings for any
offense after the first. The justice would send a certificate which
would be a "full bar" against any prosecution by the sessions
court. 15 The registration procedure that the law of fornication had
become was now formally decriminalized. Not a single woman was
presented before the Middlesex Sessions Court for fornication after
1785. And within ten years women were able to institute paternity
actions without even a prior confession before a justice. 96 Paternity
suits-although still called bastardy cases-became essentially
civil disputes handled in accordance with legalistic standards.
From our perspective these changes constituted little more than a
formalization of long-standing judicial practice and innovation. In
Middlesex County, the largest part of the criminal business of the
sessions court had long been effectively decriminalized.
D. Roads.
Central to any understanding of the Middlesex Sessions Court
as a court of government is an appreciation of how it exercised its
responsibilities over the roads and bridges of the county. In later
years, county government would be seen as little else than a road-
builder. And while this certainly would not be an accurate descrip-
tion of the preRevolutionary court, it is equally clear that through-
out the eighteenth century road building and maintenance were
important aspects of the work of the court.
The powers of a sessions court over roads and bridges seem to
fall into three categories: the power to lay out county highways
directly, a judicial capacity to prosecute towns and individuals
criminally for harming or neglecting county bridges or highways, 9'
and a general ability to decide any disputes that might arise be-
95. 1785Acts, c. 66.
96. Nelson, op. cit. supra note 4, at p. 457.
97. County highways were roads that connected one town with another.
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tween town and town, town and individual, or individual and indi-
vidual over the construction and maintenance of county highways,
town roads or private ways. Yet such a tripartite division is decep-
tive. Prior to the 1790's the Middlesex court only infrequently exer-
cised its power to lay out new highways. In many years it would
hear no more than one petition for a new highway or for an altera-
tion in an old one. Its prosecutorial role against individuals was
equally limited. In both 1733 and 1738, in most ways peak years of
court activity, the court heard no presentments against any indi-
vidual for encroaching on or harming a county highway or bridge.!' ,
The court did prosecute towns with some frequency. In 1743, for
example, the sessions court heard six presentments against towns
of which five alleged failures in road or bridge maintenance. 99 But
prosecutions against towns were only formally criminal proceed-
ings. Out of 29 presentments heard by the court in the years studied
between 1728 and 1803, towns were convicted and fined in only
three cases. The more usual procedure was for the court to order
continuances until the condition complained of was repaired.
Meanwhile the costs of prosecution would accumulate (which
would always be borne by the defendant town), so there was a
strong incentive for a town to obtain its discharge from the court as
quickly as possible.
We can best think of the whole of the court's road business in
the years prior to the Revolution as defined by its responsibilities as
a dispute settler and a regulator of the actions of others. Even when
the court laid out or altered a highway, the towns in which the way
was located were responsible for the actual construction work.
Towns, in fact, had a direct responsibility for the construction,
maintenance and repair of all public roads and bridges within the
county. And much of the court's work was directed to ensuring that
town selectmen fulfilled their obligations to town residents. Towns
had, for example, an obligation to lay out and open ways within the
town so that residents could get to public meeting from their
homes. A man or woman who felt that a town had unreasonably
refused to open a town way might petition the court for relief. 100 An
individual, moreover, could compel the financial support of a town
for his or her own private way, if it could be shown to be of common
"necessity and convenience." And conversely, a town could be held
98. But see John Collidge, dismissed, MGS Record, 5-43.
99. See for example, Selectmen of Newton, presented, MGS Record, 3-43,
5-43, 12-43.
100. See Petition of Thomas Stone and others, ibid., 4-38, 5-38, 7-38,
8-38; see also footnote 126, infra.
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liable for damages sustained as a consequence of the construction
of a town or county way.10 '
At the same time, the court also settled disputes that might
arise between town and town or individual and individual. It would
allocate the costs of maintenance between the various towns de-
pendent on a bridge in the same way that it also decided how much
two farmers should each contribute to the common upkeep of a
private way they shared between them. Petitions and courterpeti-
tions would be heard and no decision of the court would be so final
that it could not be reopened by a new petition presenting new or
restated information.1 1 2 The gate Joseph Willson of Malden kept
over the way leading to Wormwood Point, like many such encum-
brances, was a continuing source of litigation between he and his
neighbors. One year he would be permitted by the court to keep up
the gate; the next year, responding to a different set of petitions, the
court would refuse him authorization to do so.1' 3
The activities of the sessions court were limited by the judicial
nature of the institution. The court did not "act" so much as it
ensured that the actions of others were both adequate and correct
and that road business was conducted in an orderly manner. As
such, the conduct of road business in Middlesex County typified a
conception of a judicial government as one that is dependent on the
actions of others.' 0 4 The Middlesex sessions court built few roads
prior to the Revolution. But it used its powers as a court to compel
others to do what it felt had to be done. Dependent on petitions and
cases, it could not plan or develop a policy. What it could do, how-
ever, was enforce a conception of order which included an obliga-
tion to maintain the roads of the county.
But by the 1790's this vision of stability and order had evidently
disappeared. Massachusetts, like the rest of the new nation was
already involved in the creation of a "transportation revolution,"' 0' 5
and Middlesex County had a central role-best exemplified by the'
Concord-Cambridge Highway and the Middlesex Canal-in that
development. Road building quickly became far and away the most
important substantive business of the sessions court. And the regu-
latory function of the court became secondary to its emerging direct
responsibilities to the Commonwealth.
101. See Petition of Merriam Foskit, ibid.,5-28.
102. See text above footnotes 136 and 137, infra.
103. MGS Record, 3-37, 3-38, 5-38, 3-43.
104. Road and bridge building also exemplify the impossibility of distin-
guishing public from private responsibilities within a pre-modern theory of
government.
105. See George Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution (1951);
Oscar and Mary F. Handlin, Commonwealth, (rev. ed., 1968).
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In quantitative terms, the growth of the court's road building
work in the 1790's was impressive. For the combined years of 1763,
1768, and 1773 the court had heard a total of ten petitions to build
or alter highways; for the years 1793, 1798, and 1803 it heard a
total of 82 such petitions. But we might argue that its self percep-
tion had already undergone a transformation in the years im-
mediately preceeding the Revolution. It is of course risky to gener-
alize from the limited business of the court in the Revolutionary
era, but it does seem evident that the court entertained less busi-
ness directed toward compelling or authorizing the actions of
others in the 1760's and 1770's than it had in the 1730's and 1740's.
Individuals no longer looked to the court for authority to act on their
own; instead, both individuals and towns increasingly asked the
court to assume direct responsibility for the creation of new roads.
And when individuals petitioned the court for relief from govern-
mental action, their petitions asked for money damages instead of
direct relief from town or county action. 106 Road building was be-
coming an exclusive right of public government. Private individu-
als might receive compensation, but they could not determine the
actions of town and county. 107
Throughout most of the eighteenth century, the process of road
building had been a relatively straightforward process. 10 A peti-
tion asking for a new road' would be presented to the justices of the
court, who would assign a committee of three justices from com-
munities adjacent to the area for the requested road to make a
report as to whether the proposed road was "necessary and conve-
nient." If the committee reported in favor of the petition, a jury
would be called to lay out the way. And the road would then be
opened and declared a public highway.
With the growth of road building business at the end of the
century, this process became vastly more complicated. The court
had to choose between numbers of alternative and competing
courses of action and between petitions and counterpetitions re-
questing damages for the consequences of the court's work. Not
only were there more requests for roads, but the process of opening
a road had become longer and more elaborate and costly.
106. See Petition of Josiah Richardson et al., MGS Record, 11-73.
107. In the nineteenth century most aspects of county road regulation
were integrated into a private law of municipal liability and a law of tak-
ings. Towns would not be told what they had to do, but courts would hold
them liable for their negligence. And similarly, eminent domain law made
unnecessary prosecutions for encroachment and much of the rest of the
regulatory practice of a sessions court.
108. Bridge building was a somewhat distinct process because of the
continuing intercession of the legislature.
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And in the course of these changes, the court grew specialized
and the justices became increasingly skillful in the conduct of their
work. 109 As other parts of the business of the sessions court disap-
peared or were legislated out of existence, the court came to exist
only for the administration of the private affairs of the county and
for road building. And one senses in the records of the court during
these years a growing confidence in the capacities of the justices as
road builders and planners. 110 During the 1790's, the Middlesex
court received more petitions for alterations in town roads-16 in
1793 and 15 in 1798-than it received for new highways-12 and
11. Many of these petitions presumably arose from the need for
more passable ways and from the unwillingness of towns to effect
109. Some parts of the process changed more slowly. Although diagrams
and surveyors' records do begin to appear occasionaly in road building deci-
sions, the basic manner of description and laying out had not changed. The
committee appointed to lay out a road over Gravel Hill in Newton, MGS
Record, 9-98, made its report as follows:
... Then we crossed over to the south side of the road to an oak tree
which we marked and which is the easterly of a row of large trees and
from this we drew a straight line to the most westerly tree but one in the
row and from thence to an elm tree marked on the other side of a barn.
By this line the whole row of trees is brought into the road, and it is of
importance to the traveller both in summer and winter that they should
be preserved. The north side of the road is a very steep bank formed by
sinking the surface of the ground to make a road in the side of the hill. In
the winter and spring those trees are found to be very serviceable in
protecting the snow and in summer their shade is equally beneficial to
shelter both men and cattle from the insufferable heat of such a situa-
tion. These trees form the northern border of a tract of land known in
this neighborhood by the name of Half-Moon. Mr. Edward Jackson
claims them as his property but nothing decisive on this subject being
offered to us-the Committee have thought it best to leave the question
of damages to be settled by the court when sufficient evidence of their
being private property shall be obtained-but we are clearly of opinion
that their utility to the road is of such magnitude that when the private
shall be ascertained it would be more proper to pay for them than to
suffer them to be removed.
110. The court became capable of minor innovation in its handling of
road building business. When Daniel Whitney and others complained that a
road laid out by the county in 1796 from Watertown to Menotomy was "er-
roneous and defective and peculiarly injurious to individuals" and peti-
tioned that the defect could be cured by a small alteration in the road, the
court traditionally would have appointed a committee to inquire into the
necessity and convenience of the alteration as a prerequisite to any substan-
tive action. Instead, in this and similar cases, the court went ahead and
appointed a committee which would immediately lay out the altered road.
Ibid., 5-98.
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improvements. But it is important to recognize that the effect of a
court ordered alteration was that a town road became a county
road. Once a town road had been altered by county order it became
a responsibility of the county,"' and we may assume that the pur-
pose of many of these petitions was in fact to put roads under
county control, given that many of the changes requested appear to
have been petty and minor. As such, petitions for alterations would
also be striking testimony to the replacement of the presentment
and other "judicial" tools of the court by direct administrative ac-
tion. Instead of using its power to prosecute and punish towns for
not maintaining roads in good repair, the sessions court now acted
as its own agency for action.
We might speculate that a most important contribution to the
court's growing administrative ability was the replacement of "lay-
ing out" juries with committees of the court. Again, the roots of this
change went back to the preRevolutionary period. In 1756, the
General Court authorized sessions courts to replace road building
juries with committees of five "disinterested" freeholders. ' 1 2 In it-
self this hardly deserves mention as a change in court procedures,
the committee of five freeholders being merely a smaller jury. But,
after the Revolution, the court began to draw these committees of
freeholders entirely from the ranks of the magistracy itself. No
longer was there any restraint by the community over the justices'
control of the road building process. Usually the committee of three
justices that had decided whether a way was "necessary and con-
venient" stayed on to become the nucleus of the committee of five
justices assigned to lay out the road. And as the volume of cases
grew towards the end of the century, such a delegation of responsi-
bility meant of necessity that virtually every member of the county
bench was regularly occupied as a member of road building com-
mittees. By 1803, the court still had a residual judicial function." 13
It still lacked some of the capacities of a modem administrative
agency. 11 3 : But skills had been acquired, and the court had taken
on much of the shape of the board of county commissioners that
would later replace it.
111. 1786 Acts, c.67
112. 1756-7 Acts and Resolves, c.18.
113. As late as 1803 the court still heard a few presentments against
towns for not maintaining highways and against individuals for encroach-
ing on highways. Commonwealth v. Eliakin Morrill, MGS Record, 3-1803;
Commonwealth v. John Mann and David Bacon, ibid., 5-1803; Common-
wealth v. Chelmsford, ibid., 11-1803 (two presentments).
113a. The most important change still to come was the ability of the court
to assume directly the costs of road construction. Until 1825 the court was
still obliged to depend on towns to bear construction costs and damages for
roads located within their borders. 1825 Acts, c.171.
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Part Two
THE CHANGING NATURE OF JUDICIAL GOVERNMENT
In 1804, county courts of common pleas assumed the legal
jurisdiction which had previously been exercised by sessions
courts. All that remained of the sessions courts' previous respon-
sibilities was a statutory set of administrative tasks. The Middlesex
Sessions Court had become an essentially modern administrative
agency. It stood as a realization of two of the central premises of
modern governmental theory: the sovereignty of a centralized sys-
tem of (state) authority in which counties and other units of local
government are merely subordinate entities, and secondly, the
need for a strict differentiation between judicial and administrative
action.
One half century earlier, the Middlesex Sessions Court had
been a very different institution. It could have conformed to no
modern governmental model. It was neither a court enforcing and
following legal norms and rules nor was it an administrator capable
of taking initiative and formulating policy within strictly defined
guidelines. It was, as we have said, a judicial government of county
life. The categories of its practice that were studied in Part One
were less aspects of a legal system than of particular county gov-
ernmental responsibilities. And in this Part we will examine how
the Middlesex sessions court interpreted those responsibilities; how
it went about conserving the peace of the county; and how that
conception of county government changed during the second half
of the eighteenth century.
A. The Use and Justification of an Undifferentiated Court of
Government.
Any analysis of a preRevolutionary sessions court has to begin
with the fact that it was a local court run by local notables. Its
mandate was to be a local problem solver. And while it would be
bound to enforce relevant provincial legislation, such as penal laws
and tax laws, the lack of integration between central and local
levels of authority meant that sessions courts were often free to
interpret that legislation to serve their own local government ends.
As our study of fornication cases demonstrated, the Middlesex
Sessions Court perfectly exemplified this conception of a largely
autonomous local institution. Criminal laws were transformed into
a governmental practice through the exercise of the court's practi-
cally unrestrained discretion. Occassionally, the court would even
move from discretionary reinterpretation to a limited, but explicit
disavowal of the authority of the legislature over county affairs. In
September 1768, for example, the owners of a milldam in Malden
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petitioned the court to be relieved from their obligation to build a
passageway ensuring the free passage of fish downstream. The
owners of the dam recognized that there was a provincial statute
which explicitly ordered them to maintain a right of way for fish,
but they asked the court to excuse them both from compliance and
from liability "because the Petit. do not think themselves obliged by
Law to make such passage way ... ," and they asked the court to
appoint a committee of three disinterested persons to investigate
the necessity of such a construction. The court agreed and ap-
pointed a committee which made the following report:
that to open a passage way in the same Dam would be a much
greater Damage to the Publick than the Fish that might [pass]
through the Same Passage Way would be of Advantage, as it
appears that there would be but few, if any.
This report was accepted by the whole court, and the prayer of the
petition was granted. I 4 The petitioners had asked the court to bal-
ance a clear legislative directive against the presumed benefits of
not enforcing that statute. The petitioners had argued that statu-
tory law, the law of the General Court, need not be the "law" of
the Middlesex Sessions Court. And in this case the court evidently
agreed. The responsibilities of a local court were distinct from those
of central authority.
But the strongest evidence for a perception of local autonomy
comes not from the cases of the Middlesex Sessions Court as such
but from the extended records of those cases kept by the court. Until
the late 1780's, when the clerk wrote a description of a criminal
case into the record book he wrote in the margin the name of the
person tried and the outcome-"Samuel Willis, fined," or Water-
town, dismissed."'f15 A case tried before the court would never be
classiflied as "D. Rex. v. -" (or Commonwealth v. -") in the
margin; nor was it so labelled in the body of the record.1" The
only time when the crown would appear in the formal record of a
case would be if the defendant forfeited his or her bond (recogni-
zance) and refused to appear for trial. Then the king's attorney
would ask the court to issue a writ of scire facias ordering the
forfeiture of the bond. I 7 And the case would be described as a con-
flict between King and individual.
114. Petition of Huldah Paine et al, MGS Record and File Papers, 9-68.
115. Ibid., 5-38.
116. File papers and presentments would occasionally carry a D. Rex v.
-heading or invoke the authority of the crown 'in the language of the
indictment. See text above footnote 135, infra.
117. See D. Rex v. Bigelo et al, MGS Record, 5-38. In many cases the
scire facias proceeding was probably a sham constructed because defen-
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We might consider this practice as announcing that, if a defen-
dant accepted the legitimacy of the county sessions court and
abided by its rules, the crime of which the person stood accused
would be viewed only from the context of the county and not as
placing him or her in conflict with a larger society. More precisely
perhaps, the practice reveals that the criminal jurisdiction of the
court was perceived as being a primarily local criminal jurisdiction,
as constituting a mandate to enforce the "peace" of the county.
Such a criminal jurisdiction was only theoretically related to the
enforcement of the King's law. So long as defendants accepted the
authority of the court, their crimes remained local community re-
sponsibilities; only when that authority was denied would a defen-
dant be placed in conflict with the crown and general public author-
ity.'' 
8
The essence of local control of the court lay less in the court's
independence from centralized authority, however, than in its de-
pendence on the support of a local public. The Middlesex sessions
court was a court of government; its responsibilities extended to all
the public affairs of the county."0 Like other forms of government
in eighteenth century America, the court lacked executive power-
the power to enforce its own directives. There were no police; con-
dant and complainant were settling their differences outside of court.
Neither litigant wanted the case to come to trial so the defendant would not
appear. The court would continue its consideration of the writ over several
meetings until agreement had been reached by the parties. Then the com-
plainant would refuse to prosecute his complaint, the defendant would pay
the cost, and the King's Attorney would sign a nolo prosequi, and the writ
would be quashed. See ibid.
118, We might speculate that refusing to place a defendant in direct con-
flict with the crown also reflected a continuing sense of a community of
sinners. All men sinned, and the ordinary sorts of sins that were the particu-
lar concerns of a sessions court (drunkenness, fornication, assault, etc.) were
hardly such as to justify separating a sinner from his or her community. The
public shame of a trial before the local public would be punishment enough.
What has been called the "battle model" of criminal procedure-in which
defendant is pitted against the power of the state-was not essential to the
conduct of a criminal trial in eighteenth century Middlesex County. See
John Griffiths, "Ideology in Criminal Procedure, or a Third Model of the
Criminal Process," 79 Yale L. Jour. 359 (1970). Trials were meant to recon-
struct order and peace, not to destroy them. It is perhaps important to note that
almost all criminal cases resulted in the imposition of fines. Out of the 411
criminal cases examined for this study as a result of which 311 persons were
punished - two persons were ordered incarcerated and two persons were
ordered whipped. In 12 other cases, whippings or servitudes of one form or
another were imposed as alternatives to payment of fines.
119. See the listing made by Nelson, op. cit. supra note 2, at p.15.
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stables were inefficient, often unwilling, and potentially subject to
conflicting loyalties. "In the Anglo-American tradition of govern-
ment . . . government did not have vast bureaucratic armies of
officials to enforce its laws, but instead relied on its subjects to aid
the few officials who did exist in their task of law enforcement." 
1 20
Effective rule depended on the ability of the court to engage the
community in its work. 
12
1
A court of government, a government by judicial forms, had to
find ways of encouraging people to come into court. The sessions
court could only govern if cases involving a wide range of issues
were brought before it, whether by petition, presentment, or com-
plaint. Its responsibilities lay in the maintenance of order, but that
order did not presuppose harmony or "peace" at least as we would
understand the term. 122 Instead, order depended on the court's ca-
pacity to control conflicts and keep them from becoming general
and endemic. And order presumed the willingness of people to
bring conflict into court. 1
23
Were the residents of Middlesex County willing to bring their
conflicts into court? At least through the first half of the eighteenth
century, the answer is apparently yes. The range of cases heard by
the sessions court was relatively extensive and wide. In 1728 the
court heard and decided 30 criminal cases and 19 civil disputes
involving nine different categories of criminal offense and 13 vari-
eties of civil action or petition. In 1733 the court heard 67 criminal
cases involving 18 defferent forms of offense. Throughout these
years, membership on the bench of the court was very stable, and
we might assume that the governmental authority of the court was
rarely questioned. New Englanders, after all, were part of a broad
120. Nelson, op. cit supra note 2 at p.34.
121. This dependence on private action for the execution of governmental
duties explains how county taxes could be so very low-often no more than
1/50th of the province tax-and usually between 300 and 500 pounds for the
whole county. Zuckerman, op. cit. supra note 5, at pp.25-26, used this fact
to argue for the insignificance of the county as a governmental unity. Yet
the nature of county governmental action indicates that he probably drew
an incorrect conclusion.
122. This conception of the "peace" is already evident in the earliest
important treatise for justices of the peace, William Lambarde's Eirenar-
chia:
For Justices of the Peace were not ordained.., to the ende to reduce
the people.., to an universall unanimities (or agreement) of mindes...
Neither is it any part of their office to forbid lawfull suites and con-
troversies . . . But to suppresse iniuicus force and violence, movend
against the person, his goods, or possessions. (1970(1581)), p.7.
123. We might therefore consider the conservation of the peace as a kind
of transitory state between self-help and the abstract justice of modem law.
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and self-conscious legal culture which would lend legitimacy to a
government by case law.
Yet, however useful it may be to assume a self-conscious legal
tradition, too much reliance on such a concept begs the important
question of how the Middlesex Sessions Court conserved the peace,
- how it governed. An institution that relies on a public to bring it
the business on which its work depends will presumably create
inducements and incentives for that business. And the criminal
practice of the Middlesex court can be viewed as including a
number of more or less explicit encouragements to criminal liti-
gants and litigation. Assault cases were almost always treated as
relatively minor crimes with fines as low as one or three shil-
lings. 124 Complainants were never punished for prosecuting frivo-
lous charges or even for using the court process as a form of
harassment. 125 Perhaps, given the ultimate ineffectuality of public
power - its inability to enforce obedience or prevent violence or
even provide accurate information - the membership of the court
preferred that persons who might use weapons to settle their griev-
ances use the law as a kind of weapon. In that way a peace might
be conserved.
There are a number of cases that might plausibly be seen as the
products of what we might call instrumental accusations.1 2 But
the following case of "bad blood" offers a direct illustration of such
a conception.
The Bloods were a family that lived on the fringes of civil soci-
ety; they were commonly considered to be horsethieves, although
124. See Eph. Littlefield, fined, MGS Record, 9-38.
125. See Ebenezer Fletcher, Timothy Flether, Zechariah Fletcher,
Thomas Wright, John Wright, Eph. Wright, Abiel Richards, and Ebenezer
Patch, all fined, ibid., 3-48 (after attacking the constable who had caught
them killing game out of season, they proceeded to accuse the constable and
his assistants of assault before a justice of the peace who had no way of
knowing the circumstances. The J. P. ordered the constable and his assis-
tants to post bond for their appearance before the sessions court on assault
charges. At trial, the constabulary were dismissed from their bonds, but no
mention was made of the circumstances of the accusation. See MGS File
Papers, 3-48.).
126. In 1737 Thomas Stone and others petitioned the court to compel
Framingham to pay the costs of constructing a road to their homes so that
they could attend public worship. A committee of the court was appointed to
report on the "necessity" of such a road, but, while the matter was under
consideration, the grand jury presented Elizabeth, Thomas Stone's wife, for
not attending public worship. The court ultimately accepted her excuse and
dismissed her from the charge, but she was still obliged to pay the fees and
costs of a trial. Elizabeth Stone, dismissed, MGS Record, 8-38; Petition of
Thomas Stone et al, ibid., 4-38, 5-38, 7-38, 8-38.
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they owned valuable property outside of Concord. 127 But what they
seem to have spent much of their time doing was suing each other
(as well as others) in court. They appear regularly in the pages of
the sessions court. And between 1724 and 1734 Elizabeth and
Robert Blood, brother and sister, sued one another for debt before
the Middlesex inferior court of common pleas at least four times. 1 2
In the course of one of those debt cases, Robert asked Samuel
Blood, a cousin, to testify in his behalf against Elizabeth. Samuel
refused, and several uncontradicted depositions by witnesses report
that Robert then threatened to accuse Samuel and Elizabeth of
lewd and wanton conduct and fornication. He seems to have car-
ried out his threat, and Samuel countered by accusing Robert of
defamation before Francis Fullam, a magistrate, who ruled that
Robert was guilty and fined him ten shillings and ordered him to find
sureties for his good behavior.
Robert appealed this decision to the sessions court, and in
March 1733 the jury declared him not guilty. The justices evidently
disagreed with the jury's verdict and declared that Robert would
pay not just the fees and costs of trial (which as we shall see was
normally expected of even a winning defendant), but also Samuel's
court costs, all of whkch together totalled nearly 15 pounds.12 9
So perhaps the case should have ended, but nine months later,
a presentment against Samuel and Elizabeth Blood for fornication
came up for trial. There had evidently been neither pregnancy nor
birth nor any other evidence of sexual intercourse, and both defen-
dants were dismissed from the presentment and declared not
guilty. But both were ordered to pay the fees and costs of their
trial. 130
The overt consequences of the case are lost to us. We do not
know if Robert succeeded in injuring the reputations of Samuel and
Elizabeth.' 3' Nor can we tell if the conclusion of the second trial
discredited Robert. To look only for the consequences of the case,
however, is to lose sight of the latent instrumental function of this
legal process. Robert used the law as an instrument of defamation.
From his point of view the way to slander someone was through
direct invocation of the criminal law. And for that purpose the jus-
tices and the grand jury of the Middlesex Sessions Court made their
law available.
127. Mr. Robert Gross was kind enough to share this information with me
in conversation.
128. See the file index in the Middlesex County Courthouse which was
put together as a WPA project and completed through 1737.
129. MGS Record and File Papers, 3-33.
130. Ibid., 9-33.
131. Whether or not Robert succeeded, five years later Elizabeth was
successfully charged with fornication. Ibid., 9-38.
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We might even hypothesize that aspects of the legal practice of
the Middlesex Sessions Court functioned to induce people to make
instrumental accusations. Consider the way costs were assigned in
criminal cases during the first half of the eighteenth century. As in
the Blood case, defendants were automatically charged the costs of
prosecution, whether or not they were convicted of the charges
against them. These costs were hardly nominal, usually more than
five times the amount of a fine that would result from conviction
and frequently upwards of five pounds.
Such an approach to cost allocation is apparently contrary both to
contemporary and modern conceptions of proper judicial process. 
32
And we have no way of knowing why the Middlesex sessions court fol-
lowed such a practice. We can, of course, always construct more or
less plausible legal rationalizations for assigning costs automati-
cally to the defendant. Its justification may have been found in a
belief that even innocent defendants ought to pay for the privilege
of being acquitted of a charge, or it may have resulted from a dis-
trust of the trial as a test of truth, from a conviction that acquittal
had less to do with guilt or innocence than with an ability to manip-
ulate technical rules of evidence.
The court may also have had more practical reasorls for charg-
ing defendants with the costs of their trials. The Court, we may
presume, did not want to assume the costs of the trials. And charg-
ing those who had complained against acquitted defendants might
discourage future complaints. Yet the practice went beyond not
charging discredited complainants; to make a formal charge
against a person was a way of ensuring that that person would be
put to cost. Whether the complaint was true or false, the defendant
would have to pay the costs of prosecution. And a defendant had no
protection against a vindicative and unwarranted charge. Perjury
was difficult to prove, since oathtaking was considered an almost
conclusive presumption of truth. 133 And perjury was in any case not
cognizable by the sessions court because it was a capital offense. As
in the Blood case, the only legally sanctioned counterweight was a
suit for criminal defamation held before a single magistrate, which
would similarly impose all costs on the defendant in that case.
We cannot know why the practice existed. Still, such a practice
would make particularly good sense in the context of a court con-
cerned to govern by attracting disputes to it for resolution. Today
we assume that in a court case litigants are primarily concerned to
defend their rights, to achieve redress for wrongs done to them, and
to assert their own interests against others. But was this the case in
the Middlesex County of the first half of the eighteenth century? It
132. Goebel and Naughton, op. cit. supra note 4.
133. Nelson, op. cit. supra note 2, at pp. 25-26.
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might well be that in a culture where rational self-interest was not
an undisputed value, a court case was more directly justified as a
way of hurting one's opponent. Perhaps one went to court not to
resolve a dispute, not just to win it, but to beat someone else. And if
that were the case a practice of forcing defendants to pay costs
would be a powerful incentive to the use of the court.
During the first half of the eighteenth century "conservation of
the peace" by the Middlesex Sessions Court had less to do with
dispute settlement and the amicable resolution of conflict than
with the maintenance of a county structure of authority. 134 The use
of a system of criminal justice to serve private and extrajudicial
ends was acceptable so long as that structure was not threatened.
And indeed, the court's success as a court of government might by
judged in part by its ability to make its process into a usable and
acceptable substitute for private violence and self-help.
At the same time, violence itself did not constitute a particu-
larly serious offense in the eyes of the justices and juries of
Middlesex Court. As we have noted, assault cases were treated
lightly, but, by contrast, cases of fraud and nonviolent economic
crime were punished far more severely than their violent counter-
parts. The most severe fine meted out by the court in any case
during the years studied for this paper was one in which the defen-
dant was accused of "fraud and deceit" and of being a cheat. In
December 1743 Phineas Blood (another Blood) was presented for
undirectly and fraudulently obtain[ing] a certain promissory
note ... whereby one Downing Chempney did promise to pay
one Samuel Jones of Concord on his order the sum of five pound
two shillings for Value received on demand and having so ob-
tained the Same the Said Phineas ... did fraudulently and de-
ceitfully with an intent to deprive the said Samuel of his Right
therein and to cheat and defraud him of the Value expressed in
the said Note insert and interline the word Jun. therein and
afterwards the s[ai]d Phineas . . . did deceitfully personate
[and] assume to one Abraham Cutting to be the s[ai]d Samuel
Jones Jun. and for the sum of forty shillings he then [and] there
received of the s[ai]d Abraham Cutting for a Writing on the
backside of the s[ai]d Note ... all which Actings [and] Doings
of the s[ai]d Phineas are a manifest Cheat [and] tend greatly to
the Destruction of Trade [and] Commerce are in evil Ex-
ample to others [and] contrary to law as also to the Peace
Crown [and] Dignity of our Lord the King...
134. For the anthropological notion of "dispute settlement" see Laura
Nader and D. Metzger, "To Make the Balance," The Ethnography of Law
(Nader, editor, 1965).
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Phineas Blood's appropriation of a five pound two shilling note and
its sale for two pounds was treated as three separate offenses, and
his punishments totalled as follows: fines of 55 pounds, or fifty
pounds plus a whipping, treble damages of £22/7/9, and two recog-
nizances for good behavior at 200 pounds plus equal sureties. 35
Secret and deceptive behavior was considered a greater threat to
the order of the community than any act of violence. And the con-
servation of the peace was not therefore a responsibility that could
be satisfied by' the redirection and legalization of threatened vio-
lence.
An effective public law depended on the court's ability to at-
tract business from all areas of county life. As a court of govern-
ment, the Middlesex court evidently felt that it had to guarantee a
hearing to anyone whose interests were affected by its decisions.
There appears to have been no notion ofres judicata; the court was
willing to rehear cases long after all issues of substance ought to
have been settled. The town of Billerica, Chelmsford, Groton,
Dracut, and Westford wrangled for the better part of the century in
court over their respective obligations for the upkeep on the Bil-
lerica Bridge. 136 And when Joseph Willson complained that he had
not been fairly treated by the court because he had not been present
when it ordered him to remove a gate from the highway running
through his property - "had he been present at said Court he could
have given such convincing Reasons of the necessity of upholding
it, as would have induced the Court to continue it notwithstanding
what was urged for its removal. . . - the court agreed to appoint a
new committee to report on the particular circumstances Willson
alleged, notwithstanding that he had been represented by legal
counsel at the previous hearing. 1:11 A court of law would deny such a
petition; a court of government could not afford to do so.
If the court tolerated the use of its machinery for purposes
seemingly distant from the usual objectives of a legal institution, it
did so because without that business it could not govern. Its author-
ity depended on the willingness of its public to bring business, how-
ever motivated, before it. And the jurisdiction of the Middlesex Ses-
sions Court was defined not by standards of justiciability, but by
its responsibility for the "peace" of the county. In order to conserve
that peace, the court's jurisdiction had to be wide and potentially
135. MGS Record, 12-43, 3-44.
136. See MGS Record and File Papers for 1731, 1738, 1761-63, 1771, and
1791; also 1699-1700 Acts and Resolves, c.25, and 1716-7 Acts and Re-
solves, c.5.
137. MGS Record and File Papers, 3-37 and 3-38; Willson was allowed to
keep up the gate for one year, ibid., 5-38.
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unrestricted, insofar as the court dealt with matters of county con-
cern. In effect, the criminal and administrative jurisdictions of the
court constituted one continuous jurisdiction for the conservation
of the peace of Middlesex County. Its criminal practice was less a
part of a province-wide system of criminal justice than a repository
of power for the use of a county government.' 3 By the same token,
much of its administrative practice was marked by a quasi-criminal
manner of procedure.
Perhaps the best way of thinking about this integrated jurisdic-
tion of the court is to imagine it as a kind of continuum. At one
extreme stood such purely administrative business as petitions to
build roads or the repair of county buildings; at the other extreme
were particular cases of violent or economic crime. But in the mid-
dle lay the great majority of the business of the court; and in the
middle categories like administrative or criminal were mixed and
had only a technical meaning. Much of what we think of as the
criminal practice of the court fell directly within this middle ground
of moral and regulatory order. In all but three of the 16 years
studied for this article nioral and regulatory crime (which we may
take as equivalent to Blackstone's categories of "Offenses against
God and religion," and "Offenses against the public health and the
public police.") constituted at least 70 percent of the criminal prac-
tice of the Middlesex Sessions Court; in every year studied between
1733 and 1783 those categories made up over 80 percent of the
court's criminal trials. Yet even statistics of such magnitude do not
reveal the full fusion of categories in ordinary practice. As we have
noted, towns were frequently prosecuted for various derelictions in
their public duties: for not having a schoolmaster or for not repair-
ing bridges or roads or a pair of stocks. Yet these towns were rarely
convicted. The only function of a trial was to coerce a town to repair
the conditions complained of. How to describe such a process? Was
it criminal or administrative?
In fact, this continuum of criminal and administrative action
seems to lie at the heart of the justification of the court, for only
through a fusion of procedures could it fulfill its mandate as a court of
government. It was not a disguised administrative agency. It had no
way of making policy, dependent as it was on single cases for its
business.' 39 At most, it acted as a regulator of the actions of others.
The only way that the Middlesex Sessions Court could control the
138. We might then think of the traditional constitutional structure of the
court in terms of a separation of powers model with power divided between
the presentment power of the grand jury, the power of the justices to impose
recognizance and costs, and the power of petit juries to order punish-
ments.
139. Maitland, op. cit. supra note 12, at pp. 447-479.
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affairs of the county, to maintain the peace as it were, was through its
success in hearing a wide range of different issues. Cases had to come
to it. And its success as a government depended on the willingness of
its public to bring matters before it for determination.
B. The Emergence of County Administration in Massachusetts.
By the 1790's the Middlesex Court of General Sessions of the
Peace was not a court of government. Dependent on the cases that
came before it, the court had become a narrowly specialized ad-
ministrative agency. The court heard relatively few cases dealing
with the preservation of an orderly society; prosecutions for moral
and regulatory crime had declined dramatically. While the popula-
tion of Middlesex County more than doubled, cases of moral and
regulatory crime declined from 59 in 1733 to only two in 1793.110
The Middlesex Sessions Court no longer conserved the peace. The
continuum of governmental business - from administrative action
to criminal justice - that had furnished an earlier description of its
practice had been broken. Only in road building did it exercise any
of its former discretionary authority.
What had happened to cause such a change? Perhaps the most
apparent causal agent in the transformation of the court was the
new control exercised by the legislature over the affairs of the
court. In the new world of post-Revolutionary America there was no
place for a discretionary problem solver that was not tied to the
sovereign people of the whole Commonwealth.1 4 1 The "public" for
the actions of the court had become, in effect, the General Court.
And there is much evidence to suggest that the Massachusetts
legislatures of the 1780's and 1790's felt a sense of discomfort with
the very existence of an institution formally committed to an undif-
ferentiated conservation of the peace. During these years sessions
140. An even more striking contrast emerges if we group all entries made
by the clerk of the court into the extended record into three categories:
county administration (including care of county buildings, taxes, and ac-
counts allowed), road construction and alteration (not including criminal
presentments for encroachment or neglect of roads and bridges), and all
other business heard by the court (criminal prosecutions, dispute settle-
ment, regulation). In 1733 those entires displayed the following pattern:
County administration ...................... 26
Road building ............................... 4
O ther ........................................ 132
In 1803, by contrast, the following pattern had emerged:
County administration ...................... 27
Road building ............................... 83
O th er ....................................... 27
141. See Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic (1969).
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courts were stripped of much of their previous authority. The Gen-
eral Court denied sessions courts any role in poor relief, declared
that sessions courts were obliged to accept the licensing recom-
mendations of town selectmen, and gave the accused fornicatress
an attractive (even seductive) option to confession before such a
court. 1 42 An undifferentiated and largely autonomous judicial gov-
ernment of county life had become an anachronism in the Com-
monwealth. And the Massachusetts legislature acted directly to
diminish the significance of the anachronism.
The clash of old and new conceptions of county government
occurred most dramatically in the act passed in 1804 which took
away the legal powers of sessions courts. The very idea that crimi-
nal jurisdiction could be moved from one court to another would
have outraged legislators of mid-eighteenth century America. It
would have been seen as a usurpation of local liberties and a
dangerous centralization of power. On the other hand, we can
hypothesize that for legislators of the early nineteenth century,
such a shift was little more than a rationalization of the legal sys-
tem of the Commonwealth. A misdemeanor case would no longer
be an instrument as well as an instance of local governmental au-
thority; it was merely an aspect of a general, state-wide system of
criminal justice - a lesser form of felony case perhaps. Legal pow-
ers belonged in one place; administrative powers in another. Ses-
sions courts did not exist to conserve a locally defined peace; rather,
they were to be the administrators of a limited number of centrally
defined concerns.
Yet, even as we recognize the growing centralization of author-
ity in post-Revolutionary America, it would be a mistake to rely
entirely on the emergent role of the legislature as a complete expla-
nation for the transformation of Middlesex county government.
That transformation had been underway well before the beginning
of the Revolution. Between 1728 and 1748, the court had prose-
cuted an average of 42 criminal cases per year; between 1753 and
1773 it heard an average of fewer than 25 such cases. And almost
all of that decline was in categories of moral and regulatory crime
which had earlier played such a formative role in the undiffer-
entiated government of the court (See Table 3). Neither in 1763,
1768, nor in 1773 had the Middlesex Sessions Court heard any pre-
sentments against towns for road or bridge violations. Except in
settlement-removal cases, which in quantitative terms were never
a large part of the court's business, the court's work as a general
142. 1788 Acts, c. 61 (providing for the support of the poor); 1789 Acts,
c. 14 (defining settlement); 1786 Acts, c. 68 (liquor licensing); 1785 Acts,
c. 66 (punishment of fornication).
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problem solver was very limited throughout this period. In the years
before the Revolution the role of a discretionary problem solver had
already narrowed considerably.
TABLE
The Declining Number of Trials for Violent, Economic, and
Moral-Regulatory Crime
Mean number of criminal trials for the years:
1728, 1753, 1788,
1733, 1758, 1793,
1738, 1763, 1798,
1743, 1768, 1803
1748 1773
Violent Crime 4.2 1.6 2.25
Economic Crime 1.8 1 2
Moral-regulatory 36 22 5.75
Crime
One model of what had happened to the court might be drawn
from the changes that occurred over our 75-year period in the allo-
cation of costs in criminal trials. By the 1750's the practice of au-
tomatically demanding payment of costs from the defendant had
changed to a system in which the loser, whether defendant or com-
plainant, paid. A practice which we hypothesized had functioned to
encourage the intrumental use of the court had been transformed
into one by which the court was pictured as a neutral dispenser of
abstract justice. The court's job was not to attract business; instead
it was to wait for cases to come before it. The court was to be
nothing but a "legal" decisionmaker - a determiner of right and
wrong.
Forty years later cost allocation practices changed again. In the
late 1790's the court began routinely assuming the costs of criminal
trials on the petition of the losing defendant. And we might take
this as a sign that the criminal law, at least as practiced by the
Middlesex court was no longer an aspect of the conservation of the
peace. It was neither an instrument of general government and
public regulation, nor was it a way of controlling and managing the
disputes of individuals, rather, criminal law had become a mobili-
zation of the power of the Commonwealth, a direct and special
invocation of governmental power and authority, for which gov-
ernment would take responsibility and pay the costs.
Vol. XX
PUBLIC LAW OF A COUNTY COURT
Together these two changes in the practice of cost allocation
suggest a general periodization for the history of the Middlesex ses-
sions court in the eighteenth century. A court of government be-
came in the 1750's and 1760's a court of law which, after the Rev-
olution, was transformed into a specialized governmental agency.
Such a three-part characterization of the history of the court has
much to recommend it, if only for its evocation of the changing
significance of a court of public law. As a periodization, however,
this abstraction is at least partially incorrect, for during the 1750's,
1760's, and 1770's, when we might presume than the court's role as
a court of law was ascendant, significant parts of its business -
notably liquor licensing and fornication prosecutions - were be-
coming increasingly routine and standardized.
There is in fact no precise line of development in the business of
the court over the second half of the eighteenth century. During
that period the court lost most of the business which had at one
time formed its work. But the ways in which that business was lost
were not uniform.
The Middlesex Sessions Court of the first half of the eighteenth
century governed by manipulating an open-ended jurisdiction, one
without sharp boundaries and one in which its responsibilities were
defined inclusively. After the middle of the century, by contrast, the
structure of sessions court work became increasingly concrete and
specific. The formal statutory jurisdiction of the court had not
changed; but the spheres of action considered to be the proper re-
sponsibility of the court narrowed and rigidified. Gradually, the
categories of its former practice either became routinized or were
legalized and integrated into doctrinal categories that were seen as
being antithetical to a court for the conservation of the peace. The
destruction of an inclusive and undifferentiated practice was fatal
to the maintenance of an effective judicial government of county
life. The court continued to respond to public problems - tran-
siency and the prevalence of bastards in the 1760's and 1770's, in-
adequate road in the 1790's. But those were problems in which the
specifically administrative skills of a sessions court had proved use-
ful.
We might say therefore that the court was redefined not just by
the intervention of central authority but also as a consequence of
the changing needs of its local public. The society was more com-
plex. No single institution could be responsive to all the varying
demands and claims of a diverse population. And the desires of
local communities may have been less for a general court of gov-
ernment than for specialized and increasingly efficient administra-
tive agencies which could take initiative and serve county needs
directly.
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It may also be that the needs of the local public of the Middlesex
Sessions Court had changed in a more radical way. During the first
half of the eighteenth century, the court had conserved the peace in
part by redirecting violence and conflict into institutionally accept-
able forms. It did not seek an end to conflict, but it did presume to
create a structure of authority which could encompass an open-
ended variety of conflicts. Such an approach to the maintenance of
order in the county was presumably justified by the implausibility
of actually stopping conflict and imposing "peace". Disputes were
as much the result of complex and unreachable psychological
needs as they were the product of rational calculation and self-
interest. 143 And the work of the court prior to 1750 might stand as a
public manifestation of the private needs of its public.
But during the next half century we can hypothesize that the
needs of the public of the Middlesex Sessions Court changed. The
decline of the "Puritan" and the rise of the "Yankee" may have
meant that new private outlets were now available to release ener-
gies and conflicts that had formerly focused on the court. 144 On the
one hand, a general and open-ended public law could not effectively
govern the the powers and actions of private individuals. On the
other hand, the attitude to regulation and the conservation of the
peace revealed in the court's work during the first half of the
143. A case which demonstrates both the pathological motivations of
some complainants as well as standing as a kind of transition case to-
ward a different conception of the role of the court is the case of Fairbanks
v. Fisk and Maxwell in 1753. Fairbanks had gone before a J.P. to accuse
Fisk and Fisk's laborer Maxwell of having pulled down a portion of Fair-
banks' fence, of allowing Fisk's cattle to graze on Fairbanks' hay and Eng-
lish grass, and "that he the complaint is afraid both by nights and by day of
having some private Injury done him [and] his Substance destroyed by the
said Asa and Robert..." Fisk and Maxwell were each fined one pound and
ordered to find sureties for their good behavior.
Fisk and Maxwell then appealed to the sessions court where a new trial
was held. In the course of the trial several neighbors of the litigants testified
that there had never been a fence where Fairbanks claimed that the two
defendants had pulled one down. Only Fairbanks and his children testified in
support of his accusation, and even Fairbanks' cousin, Job Fairbanks tes-
tified that the day after the two were supposed to have knocked down the
fence he saw "there was but seven Lengths and there never was no more
and that was all standing but one and it joyned not to any enclosure and
there was nothing inclosed by said fence..." Fisk and Maxwell were judged
not guilty and were dismissed without paying any fees or costs. Fairbanks'
son was ordered to post bond for his appearance before the Superior Court of
Judicature because he was "vehemently suspected" of being guilty of per-
jury. MGS Record and File Papers, 9-53.
The notion of litigation as a way of releasing private anxieties and ten-
sions is developed in John Demos, A Little Commonwealth (1970).
144. Richard Bushman; From Puritan to Yankee (1967).
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eighteenth century was no longer needed as a redirection of unre-
solvable conflict. The public of the court had changed and no longer
brought it the cases that once had sahped its governmental practice.
From this perspective, the practice of the Middlesex Sessions
Court at the turn of the nineteenth century symbolizes not just the
transformation but also the failure of a particular conception of
county government. A county court of government depended on the
allegiance of a local public. But by the late eighteenth century that
allegiance was not forthcoming. The wide ranging complaints, pe-
titions, and presentments which had once created the govern-
mental practice of the sessions court had disappeared. County gov-
ernment had become an institution of limited utility and value. The
essential notion that lay behind the c6nservation of the peace - the
notion of a responsibility for the general corporated affairs of a
county - had become alien and implausible. A local public had
grown unresponsive to the values represented by an undiffer-
entiated judicial government. And so that older conception of a
judicial government of county life was replaced by a bureaucratic
model of county government, by a conception of an institution re-
sponsible only for specific categories of county action and adminis-
tration. 145
145. Judicial government presumably came to an end in 1804. But that
was not the end of the legislative restructuring of county government. In
1807 courts of general sessions were replaced by courts of sessions held by a
small number of specially appointed justices rather than all of the J.P.s in a
county. 1807 Acts, c. 11, as amended c.57. In 1809 these courts of sessions
were themselves abolished and their remaining responsibilities added to
those of the courts of common pleas. 1809 Acts, c.18. In 1811 courts of
sessions were reinstated. 1811 Acts, c.81. In 1813 all of the courts of ses-
sions except those in Suffolk, Nantucket, and Dukes Counties were
abolished again. 1813 Acts, c.197. And in 1818 they were re-reinstated.
1818 Acts, c.120. Commissioners of highways empowered to cause roads to
be built at county expense were created in 1825. 1825 Acts, c.171. And in
1828, the courts of sessions were abolished for the last time. County com-
missioners were created to assume the responsibilities of both courts of
sessions and highway commissioners. 1827 Acts, c.77.
Throughout this period of turbulent structural change the actual practice
of government in Middlesex County remained constant. Aside from a small
residual criminal practice, the institution of county government was al-
ready in 1803 almost identical with what it would become by 1828-or even
1838. The jobs of the sessions court at the end of the eighteenth century and
the beginning of the nineteenth century were the same jobs performed by
the later courts of sessions and by the county commissioners. All through the
first third of the nineteenth century the records of Middlesex County reveal
a rather dull and unchanging story of roads being built, jails and court
houses repaired and reconstructed, and taxes laid. The structure of author-
ity may have changed; the business of county government had not.
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